And still more from Iraq . . .

Also quoted in full, without editing/comment:

“On the subject of contractors and your tax dollars, I have a new acronym for you – “P-S-D” – “Personal Security Detail.”  Because the military is stretched so thin, the US Government hires PSD firms to provide security details for various government departments.
> PSDs are armed to the hilt and drive armored SUVs with impunityNo laws apply to them.  They are not official US entities and national laws here do not really exist.  Essentially, they are the mercenaries of the 21st century.  Everyone is terrified of them: local citizens, official US personnel, the military, me, etc.  The Department of State here uses the firm Blackwater (one of the more notorious PSDs) to provide
security.  A week and a half ago, a convoy of Blackwater SUVs was moving through the city – they came up on a taxi that was stopped at a stop sign.
> They honked once at the taxi, which for some reason did not move out of their way.
  To emphasize their point, they drew their automatic weapons and fired
multiple times into the car.
  The three men (all unarmed, fathers, and on their way to work) were killed (murdered).  The SUVs then sped off.  As of today, the US has not apologized and the Blackwater employees (all Americans) have been “transferred.”
> There have been several demonstrations – and there will be more.  Their actions make it very difficult for other “official” Americans to move around.
> Unfortunately, events of this kind are all too common. It is easy to understand why the people here no longer welcome our “assistance.”
>
> As a follow-up to the refinery explosion of two weeks ago, the same facility was flooded with 20,000 barrels of oil last week.  This new “incident” will set back repairs about a year.  At this point, it is uncertain whether the cause was gross negligence or sabotage – but the distinction between the two is becoming harder to make.  The immediate result was that the cost to fill a tank of natural gas for cooking went from $1 to
$15.  If “improvement” in the lives of these people continues at this rate, we will need to bring back the $1,000 bill.”

Attacking habeas corpus

Republican Senator Lindsey O. Graham of So. Carolina is not up for re-election until 2008, and I cannot find that South Carolina has any provisions for a recall campaign except for its statewide offices. Presumably this is partly why Graham was picked to spearhead the White House attack on habeas corpus.

“HABEAS CORPUS. Lat. (You have the body.) The name given to a variety of writs, (of which these were anciently the emphatic words,) having for their object to bring a party before a court or judge.”

“The sole function of the writ is to release from unlawful imprisonment. . . The office of the writ is not to determine prisoner’s guilt or innocence, and ONLY ISSUE WHICH IT PRESENTS IS WHETHER PRISONER IS RESTRAINED OF HIS LIBERTY BY DUE PROCESS.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., caps added)

Make no mistake. Current moves in our GOP-dominated Congress regarding the “detention” of “terrorists” are not security measures. They do not defend the American people. They do not protect us from actual terrorists — some of whose relatives may well have been shepherded out of the U.S. right after 9/11 by this White House. They do not attack terrorists. They attack the ancient right of habeas corpus, which underlies our most immediate freedoms, namely the everyday right NOT to have our persons or property seized without reason, or for unnamed reasons.

This point is so fundamental that it is impossible that Sen. Graham fails to understand it. Lindsey Graham is an attorney, and every law student is required to take a Constitutional Law course in law school.

Only the most ignorant or gullible person, and Mr. Graham is neither, could honestly believe that accused terrorists should be treated differently from other accused persons. An accusation is still an accusation. Only to the abjectly ignorant, and Mr. Graham is not that, does the word “terrorist” mean “someone with magical powers.” Only a pitiably ignorant, rabidly bigoted or quasi- illiterate individual could seriously believe that accused terrorists have such telepathic powers, like Johnny Carson in his turban reading an envelope through his forehead, that our security is undermined by — by what? By merely telling them the charges against them.

Any infringement on habeas corpus is a straight-out, cynical taking advantage of ignorance.

But worse than that, it is a practice that puts all of us in danger of the same fate as accused terrorists. Make no mistake. This is not a practice that can be limited to one category of individuals. The basis of the right of a writ of habeas corpus is humanity. You don’t have to be some special kind of person; you just have to be a person. Therefore, since we are all people, any law or procedure that takes it away, takes it away from all of us.

If anyone can be detained without even being told the charges against him — then, anyone can be detained without being told the charges against him or her.

It is small consolation that Sen. Graham himself could become a “detainee.” By the time things get so horrendous, so overt, that even individuals like him rebel, the damage will be irretrievable.

 

Those Saudi flights: Did anyone check the luggage?

Anyone concerned about the events of September 11, 2001, owes a debt of gratitude to writer Craig Unger, who posted the manifests of those Saudi flights online.

http://www.houseofbush.com/bush_saudi_files.

The flights referred to were several commercial aircraft leaving the country with Saudi nationals aboard, immediately after September 11.

 

According to the report of the independent commission,

California’s blackouts, California’s terrorists

 

Reading the White House web site (www.whitehouse.gov) is a lesson in history, especially for the early months of 2001. Sometimes it does look as though the Bush administration was directed by evil stars, before 9/11, to do everything richly wrong.

 

Take one day in history, May 3, 2001. On that date, we find “Remarks by the President, Secretary of Energy Abraham and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz After Energy Advisors Meeting” in the Roosevelt Room:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010503-4.html.

 

It’s almost funny:

“This administration is deeply concerned about California and its citizens. We’re worried about blackouts that may occur this summer. And we want to be a part of any solutions. Since I became sworn-in [sic], we’ve been working with the state of California to provide regulatory relief to encourage an increase in the amount of supplies available for the consumers in that state.”

 

Obviously, any remarks by GWBush addressing energy problems in California then, given what we now know about Enron manipulations at the time, tend to arouse sardonic humor. Steps proposed were modest, aside from the deregulation: 

 

First, “Today, I am instructing all agencies, federal agencies, to reduce their peak hour electricity use in the state of California. And the Secretary of Energy will be traveling to the state today to consult with the governor of the state of California, as well as work with our respective agencies in that state.” [Reducing peak hour use is a good idea, especially if you couple it with flex time for government employees. But why did Secretary Abraham have to waste jet fuel by traveling to California personally, rather than coordinate by videoconference call from DC?]  

 

“Secondly, I am pleased to report that the Secretary of Defense, after a careful review, believes that this Department, which has got a large presence in the state of California, can reduce peak hour usage by 10 percent — and can do so without harming military readiness.” [Paul Wolfowitz goes on to explain that the DoD uses one percent of California’s peak energy load, so a 10% reduction in DoD use would presumably reduce peak use 1% over-all, in California. This reduction seems not to have occurred.]

 

In the White House press briefing the same day, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer was on message with the same proposal:  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/briefings/20010503.html#NationalEnergyPolicy.

 

In line with White House energy concerns on May 3, the GOP-led House of Representatives held a hearing on “Geothermal Resources on Public Lands,” one of a series of GOP-instigated attempts to move public opinion in favor of drilling in national parks and other federal land.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house_hearings&docid=f:72134.wais

[So far as is known, Old Faithful at Yellowstone National Park has not yet been harnessed for steam energy.]

 

A few items of information, for context:

May 3 is also the date of a transcript from the ongoing federal terrorism trial, in New York:

http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/background.html

On this particular trial date, in the US Court for the Southern District of New York (New York, NY, Honorable Leonard B. Sand, District Judge, presiding), one finds the prosecutors reviewing statements by terrorist suspect Wadih El Hage, about when he became aware of Usama bin Laden’s declaration “that America should be attacked.”  Throughout the early months of 2001, during which time the Bush administration including Bush, Cheney, and Condoleezza Rice have repeatedly said they had no idea blahblahblah, federal servants were combing over defendants from the bombing of the World Trade Center influenced by UBL’s fatwa against America, in federal court in New York City. No wonder New Yorkers have doubts about Bush.

 

Also on May 3, the CIA sent a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) around to the top people in the Bush administration: title: “Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack.” (http://pocket-pc-ebook-reader.com/911/15.08.NOTES_TO_CHAPTER_8.htm)

 

Meanwhile, in other action that month — May 2001 — the administration introduced the “Visa Express” program in Saudi Arabia, allowing any Saudi Arabian to obtain visas for entry into the US through a travel agent rather than through a US consulate. 

 

Also on May 3, Bush appointed one of the administration’s remaining counter-terrorism experts as Ambassador to Yemen:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010504-3.html.

 

Also on that date, by coincidence, Tennessee’s GOP governor, Don Sundquist, “signed SB 1266 authorizing a person without a social security number to receive a driver’s license if the person submits an affidavit affirming that they have never been issued a social security number. The act further allows noncitizens to be given a driver’s license if they provide proper documents demonstrating identification.”

http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway/09-05-02/waters.html

[It is hard not to notice the almost magically poor judgment so often exercised by GOP officeholders when it comes to genuine public health and public safety issues. They tend to be Johnny-on-the-spot about awarding big corporate contracts, though.]

 

May 3, 2001, seems to have been a busy day for misfeasance.

The Campaign for Global War

[This is an edited version of a column from 2004, still applicable.]

 

John F. Kerry wanted terrorism to be reduced to a nuisance.  George W. Bush was and is hyping and nudging terrorism to become a world war. 

 

That, in a nutshell, is the monstrous situation facing ordinary people in America today. We have someone in the White House doing something so demented, dementia with a case of giantism to boot, that normal public discourse almost contains no words to characterize it.

 

As time passes, Bush faces an increasing possibility of impeachment. More and more information is coming out that demonstrates that every argument used to justify invading Iraq was a pretext. The pretexts, furthermore, were developed and coordinated both inside and outside the administration, with private individuals including media persons as well as government officials.

 

Meanwhile, prudent undertakings that could improve safety or reduce vulnerabilities are being neglected at best and actively undermined at worst. Rather than adopt intelligent diplomacy, the White House has thrown gasoline on the flames, partly by making offensively provocative personnel appointments. Rather than secure domestic sites, the administration has neglected to safeguard borders and ports, nuclear and chemical sectors. Genuine security experts still point out major gaps in aviation security, with AVSEC breaches continuously reported.

 

Rather than adopt consistent measures to stop up security breaches including financial chicanery from top to bottom, the administration turns a strangely blind eye to managerial ties that bind contractors in even our most sensitive sectors to foreign businesses and foreign governments.

 

That anyone like Bush could pretend to protect and defend the American people is Orwellian, although not merely Orwellian. He’s using his biggest weaknesses as weapons, the old guerrilla tactic in reverse (without being an underdog), since in “wartime” genuinely patriotic individuals are reluctant to point out lapses. Like envious Iago the petty, he traps critics with their own virtues.

 

The tactic is an assault on the polity, penalizing most those people who most care about participatory democracy. It benefits someone who wishes to undo every achievement left by the New Deal and producing a large and self-confident middle class, including a strong Social Security system, corporate regulation including a Securities and Exchange Commission, and retirement pensions and health insurance for ordinary people.

 

Domestic policy and foreign policy are often discussed as though they were separate. In this administration, the two are blatantly part of one picture. The objective of treating 19 skyjackers as though they were the late Soviet Union is the same as the objective of tearing down the economic safety net at home:  these guys are pocketing our peace dividend.

 

One ironic result is that immense pressures have been piled upon the general public, the press and the loyal opposition, to sweep 9/11 under the rug. Vice President Cheney said many months ago on Meet the Press that we should put 9/11 behind us (a statement overlooked by major media outlets). The White House opposed forming any investigative commission as long as it could, stonewalled every congressional and commission request for key information, and is opposing 9/11 litigation to prevent discovery. Individuals willing to enrage the public by undermining every kind of investigation, through any avenue, are not going to give up easily.

 

Eventually, thinking people in the news media and in academia and in public office are going to have to face the key question: why would an administration so eager to exploit 9/11 be so intent not to investigate it?

Showing off, clamming up, leaks and plants

Bob Woodward’s statement about the CIA leak case includes questions asked by the prosecutor but apparently not answered by Woodward.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/16/AR2005111601017_2.html

 

Woodward says, for example, that Fitzgerald “asked if I had possibly planned to ask questions about what I had learned about Wilson‘s wife with any other government official.” The question is not answered in the statement, nor does the statement clarify whether Woodward answered it in his deposition. Why not?

 

This question rises in the middle paragraph (graf 10 of 19 paragraphs; the page break on the Post’s web site), about as far down as you can bury a lede. Backward and forward lie similar questions.

 

“When asked by Fitzgerald if it was possible I told Libby I knew Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA and was involved in his assignment, I testified that it was possible I asked a question about Wilson or his wife, but that I had no recollection of doing so.” Thus possibly Woodward “asked” a question about Wilson or his wife, but this does not answer the question whether Woodward “told” Libby about Wilson’s wife. Why not?

 

Continuing, Woodward says that “My notes do not include all the questions I asked, but I testified that if Libby had said anything on the subject, I would have recorded it in my notes.” The open question remains open: if Woodward had told Libby about Wilson’s wife, would he have included that in his notes?

 

There is no reason to infer that Woodward told Libby about Wilson’s wife. We are never told whether Vice President Cheney saw or responded to the 18-page list of questions Woodward had prepared for him. But we do know by now that Cheney himself had passed along the information about Mrs. Wilson to Libby, his chief of staff. By the time Woodward was in conversation with Libby, both men probably had no need to discuss Mrs. Wilson further. Joe Wilson responds in reply to emailed questions that, after having been given the information about Mrs. Wilson, Woodward did not get in touch with the Wilsons to follow up or to check.

 

Regarding the personal interview with Libby, the statement continues, “I testified that on June 27, 2003, I met with Libby at 5:10 p.m. in his office adjacent to the White House. I took the 18-page list of questions with the Page-5 reference to ‘yellowcake’ to this interview and I believe I also had the other question list from June 20, which had the ‘Joe Wilson’s wife’ reference. I have four pages of typed notes from this interview, and I testified that there is no reference in them to Wilson or his wife.”

 

What about his handwritten notes? Or was this interview tape-recorded, as with the other interview mentioned previously in the statement? Why does the statement not clarify what records Woodward kept, in these four conversations pursuant to the inquiry?

 

“A portion of the typed notes shows that Libby discussed the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction, mentioned “yellowcake” and said there was an “effort by the Iraqis to get it from Africa. It goes back to February ’02.” This was the time of Wilson‘s trip to Niger.” Does this meanLibby said that the Iraqi “effort” to get yellowcake from Africa goes back to February ’02? Was Libby implying that the Iraqis tried to purchase yellowcake in response to Wilson’s trip? Did Woodward not bother to follow up on this because it was preposterous?

 

Regrettably, some larger questions promise to remain unanswered for a while. Did Libby get in touch with Woodward, or Woodward with Libby, in response to an article by Post reporter Walter Pincus, referring to Wilson’s Africa trip? Did that call, the day after Pincus’ article, set up the following interview with Libby? Was there going to be White House damage control at the Post, handled by Woodward?

 

In the interview, was Libby filling in for Cheney on the 18-page list of questions, including the yellowcake one? Did Cheney ever see any of those questions? Was Cheney around for the interview with Libby?

 

Was Cheney ever asked about the bogus Niger-uranium story, by Woodward? If not, why not?

 

And why does Woodward’s own statement publish questions not answered? Was that some journalistic muscle-flexing, to make up for all the previous knuckling under?

 

[This blog is a slightly edited version of this week’s column in the Prince George’s Sentinel.]

Following Woodward statement, questions bigger than ever

In response to questions emailed to him, former ambassador Joseph Wilson has clarified that Post reporter Bob Woodward was not himself present at the June 14, 2003, DC conference where Wilson referred to his Africa trip. (Was that conference “mid-June 2003,” cf. Woodward’s published statement?)

 

Wilson also responds that Woodward was not present when the Post interviewed Wilson on July 6, 2003, when Wilson’s op-ed appeared in the New York Times.

 

Also in emails, Wilson responds in reply to questions that after being told that Mrs. Wilson was a CIA analyst, Woodward did not get in touch with either Wilson or his wife to check. Nor, if indeed Woodward passed this item along to Post reporter Walter Pincus, did Pincus. (Pincus reportedly has no recollection of Woodward’s telling him.)

 

A phone message left with Woodward and messages for his office via other offices at the Post, left the week before Thanksgiving, have not been answered. Reportedly Woodward has also not agreed to be interviewed by other Post reporters, although he and editor Len Downie have had some form of communication, and he has responded to some questions relayed by the new and very good Post ombudsman.

 

Meanwhile, big media wagons are being circled. Two Sundays ago, two different talking heads, on two different morning talk shows at ABC, both suggested that Richard Armitage might be Woodward’s unnamed source. This would have the effect of discrediting the State Department, as one of the talking heads pointed out, along with the Cheney-Rumsfeld axis in the administration. This past Sunday, the CIA leak or plant was all but ignored on the talk shows.

 

The Washingtonian magazine is about to publish a feature, complete with photo line-up, of the 50 most influential media figures in Washington. According to the Post, the feature will include Downie and also the Post’s “media critic,” Howard Kurtz, known for not holding the Post to the standards he allows for some other newspapers.

 

Many questions arise from the text of Woodward’s published statement. Some of the more detailed questions have already been printed; some will come out in days and weeks ahead. Larger and broader questions also lie ahead.

 

Several commentators, including me, have already noted questions for Woodward that are similar to questions for Judith Miller, formerly at the NYTimes. If some administration figure passed along a damaging item to Woodward and he sat on it, then he was in effect sitting on a story – not about Mrs. Wilson, but about how the administration was going after its critics. Why did he do so?

 

Both Woodward and Miller have made the argument, or had the argument made for them, that they were not even writing about the Plame leak story. So, in keeping the story (of administration tactics) quiet, were Woodward and Miller acting as journalists?

 

And how is keeping the aggressor’s name a secret the same as protecting a source? This was not protecting a whistleblower, exposing governmental wrongdoing. If anything, it was protecting a public official who indulged in behind-the-scenes retaliation against Wilson’s rather mild whistleblowing.

 

On top of Mrs. Wilson’s name, we still do not know from the Woodward statement printed in the Post whether the name of the CIA front company Brewster-Jennings came up, or with whom, or in what context. All we know about the front company as of now, aside from its role in regard to Saudi oil, is that Robert Novak outed it too, after outing Mrs. Wilson.

 

We know that Bush had big problems re Iraq “WMD” as of June 2003. His two trailers full of chemical weapons were just trailers. His weapons (Iraqi) were morphing into weapons “programs.” The PNAC neo-cons who had celebrated the end of major combat with him in March were becoming more subdued in June. Headlines everywhere but America were wondering in print what, if anything, had become of Saddam’s WMD.

 

Wilson had made his Africa trip at the beginning of 2003, had found nothing to go on, justifying concerns about an imminent and largescale Iraq threat – and the White House had rushed to war anyway. Now, on June 14, there was that Capitol Hill conference at which Wilson referred to his Niger trip and mentioned to Ray McGovern, retired (genuine) CIA analyst, that he was about to go public with the information.

 

Was that why the unnamed administration official called Woodward? – Or did Woodward call him? Was the interview itself in person or by phone? How hurried was it? How urgent was it?

 

Following that conversation, Woodward included mentions of Wilson’s wife in at least two lists of questions or notes, and then took those questions or notes to other interviews. Why?

 

Woodward says in his statement that he has no recollection of asking about Mrs. Wilson. Is it possible that indeed he did not ask about her, because he knew perfectly well that the item was a plant? – And therefore that the administration was indeed, in all probability, engaging in retaliation against Wilson and some attempt to intimidate future critics?

 

Did he ever make, or try to make, an appointment with Vice President Cheney, about this matter?

 

Woodward’s statement says that Libby brought up the Niger story, days after another official told Woodward about Wilson’s wife, but without mentioning Wilson’s wife. In response, according to the statement, Woodward either didn’t ask about Wilson or his wife or does not remember doing so. If Libby never mentioned Wilson to Woodward, isn’t it possible that’s because they both knew he didn’t need to do so, since Woodward had already been told?

 

The entire narrative about Niger gives rise to one of the biggest questions of all: What else have they been sitting on?

 

working backward from Woodward

Woodward’s printed statement on the CIA leak case (“Bob Woodward’s Public Statement,” Washington Post, Nov. 16) was so puzzling that I ran it backward, to see whether it would parse better that way. Excerpting from the final graf backward to the beginning clarified some questions, as follows:

 

“It was the first time in 35 years as a reporter that I have been asked to provide information to a grand jury.”

  • So why did you think you would be subpoenaed this time?

 

“I answered all of Fitzgerald’s questions during my testimony without breaking promises to sources or infringing on conversations I had on unrelated matters for books or news reporting _ past, present or future.”

  • How could any comprehensive reporting on the invasion of Iraq be unrelated to the leak case?

 

“My testimony was given in a sworn deposition at the law office of Howard Shapiro of the firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr instead of appearing under subpoena before a grand jury.”

  • Why?
  • How was this deposition arranged?

 

“When asked by Fitzgerald if it was possible I told Libby I knew Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA and was involved in his assignment, I testified that it was possible I asked a question about Wilson or his wife, but that I had no recollection of doing so. My notes do not include all the questions I asked, but I testified that if Libby had said anything on the subject, I would have recorded it in my notes.”

  • Do your prepared lists of questions show which questions you asked?
  • So your notes include everything Libby said?
  • Did he say anything about the CIA front co. called Brewster-Jennings?

 

“I testified that on June 27, 2003, I met with Libby at 5:10 p.m. in his office adjacent to the White House. I took the 18-page list of questions with the Page-5 reference to “yellowcake” to this interview and I believe I also had the other question list from June 20, which had the “Joe Wilson’s wife” reference.”

  • Why? Why did you take these references with you to see Libby?
  • Did the two questions lists have other questions in common that you did not ask?
  • Did you take any other lists or prepared material?
  • Did you ask about Brewster-Jennings?

 

“I testified that on June 20, 2003, I interviewed a second administration official for my book “Plan of Attack” and that one of the lists of questions I believe I brought to the interview included on a single line the phrase “Joe Wilson’s wife.” I testified that I have no recollection of asking about her, and that the tape-recorded interview contains no indication that the subject arose.”

  • Was the entire interview tape-recorded?
  • Did you take notes at this interview?
  • Do you still have any notes or notations you made during all these interviews?
  • Did you jot down anything from the interview on the list of questions, including which questions you asked?
  • Did you omit asking about Mrs. Wilson because the item about her looked like a plant?
  • Have you kept all notes and recordings you made at these interviews?

 

“Fitzgerald asked if I had discussed Wilson‘s wife with any other government officials before Robert Novak’s column on July 14, 2003. I testified that I had no recollection of doing so.”

  • Aside from what you yourself discussed, did you hear anything else about Wilson’s wife from any other government officials before Novak’s column?
  • Did you receive anything in writing/print about Wilson’s wife before Novak’s column, from any other government officials?
  • What about after Novak’s column?

 

“I have not been released to disclose the source’s name publicly.”

  • Why not?
  • Since the source has already gone to the prosecutor, doesn’t the public have a right to know?

 

“I was first contacted by Fitzgerald’s office on Nov. 3 after one of these officials went to Fitzgerald to discuss an interview with me in mid-June 2003 during which the person told me Wilson’s wife worked for the CIA on weapons of mass destruction as a WMD analyst.”

  • Why did the official go to Fitzgerald?

 

“All three persons provided written statements waiving the previous agreements of confidentiality on the issues being investigated by Fitzgerald. Each confirmed those releases verbally this month, and requested that I testify.”

  • By “verbally,” do you mean “orally”? Or are you saying that they confirmed those releases using words rather than, for example, sign language?
  • Did they confirm those releases to you directly?

 

“On Monday, November 14, I testified under oath in a sworn deposition to Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald for more than two hours about small portions of interviews I conducted with three current or former Bush administration officials that relate to the investigation of the public disclosure of the identity of undercover CIA officer Valerie Plame.”

  • How could you be sure that only small portions of interviews about the lead-up to the Iraq war relate to the CIA leak investigation?

 

A call to Woodward at the Post, last week, and several emailed requests that messages be forwarded to him have not been answered.

Recommending the book Thieves of Baghdad

Thieves of Baghdad by Matthew Bogdanos (available by year end, from Bloomsbury) is an illuminating read for anyone interested, from any perspective, in primary sources and first-hand experience in combat in Iraq.

 

(Two disclosures here: My advance reading copy of Thieves of Baghdad does not include the endnotes, and I went to high school with William Patrick, who collaborated on the book with Bogdanos.)

 

The author is understandably proud of his Greek-American family heritage. He is also proud of his pugilism, of his love of the classics, and of his career as a New York prosecutor and as a Marine, all of which he links together, so that his writing about trying to recover priceless antiquities in Iraq is thronged by friendly ghosts including Aeschylus, Thucydides, and Agatha Christie Mallowan.

 

Several important points emerge. First, the mission to recover items looted from the huge Baghdad Museum was ad hoc, drawing largely on the persistence, courage and expertise of a few individuals. Bogdanos largely put together the archaeological and artifacts recovery team, headed it with few personnel but with relative mobility, and operated in direct contact with Iraqis at virtually all levels. Their success was achieved by careful investigation and a nationwide amnesty for returned artifacts.

 

Second, in spite of early and popular successes, Bogdanos and his team were pulled from the mission before it was complete. The mission was truncated even though, and while, it was also a public relations success.

 

Third, the author argues concretely that early press reports of the looting of the museum itself were grossly exaggerated. Destruction and theft at the museum were devastating, but the numbers purveyed by the largest media outlets were unfounded.

 

If this point sounds like an apologetic, it should be placed in perspective by the related fact that the destruction and looting at the chief museum itself were only one part of the wider and more everyday looting at archaeological sites all over Iraq. The looting and commerce based on looting continue, little abated, to this day.

 

Bogdanos gives full credit to the personnel of eight law enforcement agencies in six countries trying to contain the illegal traffic in antiquities: Interpol, U.S. Customs, Scotland Yard, British, Kuwaiti and Jordanian customs, Italian carabinieri in Iraq, and U.S. Attorney offices in New Jersey and New York. However, he also makes clear that the entities involved lack the resources to stop illegal trafficking. One oddity of this looseness in the war on terror, of course, is that smugglers in illegal antiquities also often smuggle weapons and explosives. When you catch the one, you catch the other.

 

But commerce is powerful. Bogdanos refers to one foreign official who denies that Iraqi antiquities had ever been found in his country, contrary to reports. His proof was that they had never, in his entire country, ever seized any Iraqi antiquities. He refers to another who responds to a request for help by arguing that that would harm their customs and excise revenues.

 

As indicators that not all the problems lie abroad, the author also gives two anecdotes of smuggling caught in the act from the U.S. One case was that of part-time academic and journalist Joseph Braude, tried in Brooklyn Federal Court in August 2004. Bogdanos, one of the witnesses against him, raises a question: “So how did a relatively obscure quasi-academic like Braude, a small fish with no money . . . get the highest-paid defense attorney in the country, a lawyer whose clients [including Puff Daddy] usually leave the courthouse each day in a limo?”

 

Another was the April, 2003, seizure by customs officials in Newark of four FedEx boxes of 669 museum artifacts stolen, including 87 cylinder seals. Bogdanos says “The proper way to deal with such a cache is to use it as bait to catch a thief.” Understandably, the haul was instead impounded, and the warning was out: “The intended recipient, a Madison Avenue art dealer, once notified of the seizure could now say, ‘I don’t know what you’re talking about . . . It must be some kind of mistake at the other end.’ The opportunity to prove that it wasn’t a mistake . . . had been squandered. The thieves were probably out bulldozing archaeological sites, the European middleman shipper was licking more mailing labels, and the scheduled recipients, who should have been working on their ‘prison pallor,’ were soaking up the sun in the Hamptons or Vail.”

 

As the author comments, “The first dot you have to connect is the number of well-placed individuals, and the amount of ‘genteel’ money, involved in the antiquities trade. These people live in the Upper East Side and in Georgetown and in Pacific Heights, not in some Mafia enclave in Pawtucket. But even more important, you have to understand that a trial like Braude’s was all about the price.

            In real estate you need comps to get approval for a mortgage, sales of similar houses in your area that establish market value. To establish market value in smuggling, you need a judgment from a court of law. The calculus the bad guys use is actually quite sophisticated. In addition to the actual value of the item itself, be it drugs, weapons or antiquities, there is the risk associated with the smuggling operation from start to finish . . . The bottom line with regard to Iraqi antiquities was that if the first guy who gets caught coming through customs gets a slap on the wrist, the price of smuggled antiquities goes down. If he does prison time, the price goes up.

            Not surprisingly then, I noticed some familiar faces, art collectors and art dealers, in the courtroom the day I testified.”

 

I must admit that the one form of pure greed I can empathize with is love of art. When I see a bargain myself, I jump at it, although my collecting is both modest and legal. But trafficking in items that belong to the ancient history of both East and West is greed of a decadence beyond what I can empathize with. Bogdanos’ book lays out constructive, measured suggestions for coordinating an international effort to impede trafficking in cultural heritage. Perhaps some of them will be put into effect.

More on January 2002

Regrettably, those overwhelmed individuals in the administration trying to dominate the world were even busier at the beginning of 2002 than last week’s column expressed.

 

All signs indicate that behind the scenes, January 2002 was a freakish window of opportunity for desk planners, a hinge in the devastating chronology linking the conquest of Afghanistan to that of Iraq.

 

Jesse Jackson observed that the defeat of Afghanistan by the USA was scarcely in doubt, a recognition probably shared by most people in touch with reality. From certain statements that have now come to light, however, it appears that there were neo-cons in the administration actually surprised that a tiny, starved nation dominated by the Taliban had been bowled over so easily by American military might. Anyone who could think the Taliban a military threat, to say nothing of a tinpot dictator like Saddam, probably has been unconsciously influenced by anti-Muslim rabidity; beyond that, some of the comments almost imply a disappointment that the war was over so quickly. Whatever the individual pathologies, however, several such thinkers began scratching around to resurrect the idea of invading Iraq, which had been temporarily tabled after its bringing up immediately after 9/11.

 

It is noteworthy that even the most distant planning for invading Iraq was accompanied by what amounts to a concomitant attack on the Bill of Rights. That January was a particularly busy month, as alert emailers have reminded me with the following chronology.

 

On January 9, 2002, a Memorandum was submitted to William J Haynes II, General Counsel to the Department of Defense, by the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department, written by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert J. Delahunty. This Yoo-Delahunty memorandum became the basis for rejecting the Geneva Convention for captured members of al Qaeda and the Taliban.

 

On January 18, 2002, the president determined that captured Talibani and Al Quaeda were indeed unprotected by the Geneva POW Convention.

 

The next day, in a memorandum dated 19 January, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform combat commanders that “Al Quaeda and Taliban individuals . . . are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”

 

This order was followed on January 22, 2002, by the Bybee memo from Jay Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, which reinforced the Yoo-Delahunty memo.

 

On January 25, 2002, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales in turn sent a memorandum to President Bush regarding his presidential decision of the 18th. The legal advisor to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell had objected, but Gonzales advised Bush that “there are reasonable grounds for you to conclude” that the Geneva Convention “does not apply . . . to the conflict with the Taliban.”

 

Thus was prepared, by a sequence of formal memoranda at the highest levels of government, a mode of operation in which individuals detained either in the United States or abroad under the rubric of the war on terror could be kept in indefinite detention; could be incarcerated without even being told the charges against them; and could be tortured.

 

Even setting aside the Bill of Rights, looking at this mode of operations from the more self-interested perspective of us still safely in our homes, we can now easily see that it also established a set-up difficult to penetrate in case of mistakes. Prisoners not allowed even to see counsel cannot tell the rest of us much. To its credit, the Pentagon has by now released large numbers of those formerly incarcerated. But the secretive authors of these ridiculous but tragic policies are not exactly thronging forward to admit past errors.

 

Every individual who had access to National Security Council meetings in the first Bush term now has the gravest possible questions to answer before Congress and the public, in regard to the uses of intelligence leading to the Iraq war.