115^th in continuing blog series on the administration push to war. The nonexistence of Iraqi WMD becomes increasingly public, but top administration figures, fighting a step-by-step rearguard action rhetorically, continue to put the best face they can on previous rationales for war.
January 17-31, 2004:

 
 
Jan. 17, 2004 – Halliburton wins a $1.2 billion contract from the Pentagon for oil industry work in Iraq. The contract is awarded to Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the southern region of Iraq, even though Halliburton is already under investigation for its controversial fuel contracts, see previous. This contract is awarded in a competitive bidding process, replacing previous no-bid contracts. Total combined value of Iraq contracts awarded to Halliburton could come to $9 billion.

A smaller $800 million contract is also awarded to Parsons, another contractor with subsequent performance troubles, for the northern region of Iraq.

Jan. 20, 2004 – The first permanent Inspector General is appointed for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq.

All signs indicate that there are channels for reporting information from Iraq and for scrutinizing abuses and profiteering in Iraq from early on, but that they are sidestepped or not used by administration policy makers.

Jan. 23, 2004 – The U.S. Department of State announces the choice of 25 Iraqi recipients of Fulbright Scholarships after a 14-year interruption of the program during wars or sanctions against Iraq. The Iraqi students, 19 men and 6 women, will study in one-year or two-year Master’s programs in the U.S. Resumption of the Fulbright program was announced in Oct 2003, and the Fulbright Board made final selection in Dec. 2003.

This announcement, which suggests a large degree of behind-the-scenes cooperation between policymakers in Washington, D.C., and some levels of government or power in Iraq, comes the same day that the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq resigns, see below.

Same day – The Wall Street Journal reports that Halliburton discloses that two of its employees accepted $6 million in kickbacks for steering supply contracts. Meanwhile, controversy over Halliburton’s KBR fuel imports continues; one problem is that the White House has applied political pressure on KBR and on the Army Corps of Engineers to continue importing oil into Iraq through pricy suppliers in Kuwait, even though other bidders were lower.

Same day – David A. Kay, chief American weapons inspector in Iraq, resigns his position in the hunt for WMD, having concluded that there are no stockpiles of such weapons.

Jan. 28, 2004 -- David A. Kay, chief American weapons inspector in Iraq, testifies before Congress that “we were all wrong” about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs:

“But I also believe that it is time to begin the fundamental analysis of how we got here, what led us here and what we need to do in order to ensure that we are equipped with the best possible intelligence as we face these issues in the future.

Let me begin by saying, we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here.

Sen. [Edward] Kennedy knows very directly. Senator Kennedy and I talked on several occasions prior to the war that my view was that the best evidence that I had seen was that Iraq indeed had weapons of mass destruction.

I would also point out that many governments that chose not to support this war -- certainly, the French president, [Jacques] Chirac, as I recall in April of last year, referred to Iraq's possession of WMD.

The Germans certainly -- the intelligence service believed that there were WMD.

It turns out that we were all wrong, probably in my judgment, and that is most disturbing.”

Kay also calls for an independent investigation into how the intelligence on Iraqi WMD could have gone so wrong. This call is resisted by the White House, see below.

Jan. 29, 30, 31, 2004 – Office of the Vice President emails for these days are missing, according to subsequent investigation.

Jan. 29, 30, 2004 – White House office emails for these days are missing, according to subsequent investigation by the House Government Committee chaired by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.).

Jan 30, 2004 -- President Bush says he won't back calls for an independent investigation of intelligence failures surrounding Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction stockpiles despite increasing demands for one by some U.S. lawmakers. Bush states that Saddam was “a danger,” and that is “one thing we do know.”

Jan 30, 2004 – Interviewed on network news programs, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice admits that Saddam may never have had stockpiles of chem., bio or nuclear weapons.

 
In a typical administration tactic, these appearances are slotted in for a Friday evening, the low point of the weekly news cycle, where the key item will be old news by Monday morning.