Oct. 13, 2003 – The Wall Street Journal reports that the U.S. has found no evidence that Saddam Hussein was planning to destroy Iraq’s oilfields. While the Pentagon has taken credit for preventing sabotage of Iraq’s oil capacity, a U.S. Army study indicates that there was never a real threat of oil fires across Iraq, and there is “little evidence that speed pre-empted an imminent scorched earth campaign.”

 

Oct. 14, 2003 – The FBI interviews I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff, in the CIA leak investigation.

 

Oct. 14, 2003 -- Sen. Tom Daschle (D-N. Dakota) asks CIA director Tenet to conduct a damage assessment regarding the CIA leak.

 

Oct. 15, 2003 – Congressmen Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) and John Dingell (D-Mich.) send a letter to Joshua Bolten, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), about the “extraordinarily high prices” that the U.S. is paying to Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root to import gasoline into Iraq.

 

Oct. 16, 2003 – The night before his FBI interview, Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman has a private meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage.
(Libby trial testimony)

 

Oct. 17, 2003 – The FBI interviews Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman for the first time about the CIA leak.
(Libby trial testimony)

 

October 2003 – After his FBI interview, Grossman goes back to Undersecretary of State Armitage and tells him that the Plame leak came up.
(Libby trial testimony)

 

Oct. 20, 2003 (about) – Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh publishes an article titled “The Stovepipe” in the New Yorker magazine, which places responsibility for the false intelligence on Iraq on administration policy from the beginning:
 

“And yet, as some former U.N. inspectors often predicted, the tons of chemical and biological weapons that the American public was led to expect have thus far proved illusory. As long as that remains the case, one question will be asked more and more insistently: How did the American intelligence community get it so wrong?

Part of the answer lies in decisions made early in the Bush Administration, before the events of September 11, 2001. In interviews with present and former intelligence officials, I was told that some senior Administration people, soon after coming to power, had bypassed the government’s customary procedures for vetting intelligence.

A retired C.I.A. officer described for me some of the questions that would normally arise in vetting: “Does dramatic information turned up by an overseas spy square with his access, or does it exceed his plausible reach? How does the agent behave? Is he on time for meetings?” The vetting process is especially important when one is dealing with foreign-agent reports—sensitive intelligence that can trigger profound policy decisions. In theory, no request for action should be taken directly to higher authorities—a process known as “stovepiping”—without the information on which it is based having been subjected to rigorous scrutiny.”

 

Oct. 21, 2003 (about) – The neocon Weekly Standard magazine, edited by William Kristol, runs a cover article by PNAC member Reuel Marc Gerecht predictably downplaying the CIA leak:      

“It is important to remember the above chemistry--the mixing of ignorance, curiosity, pride, and self-importance--when thinking about former ambassador Joseph Wilson and his "outed" CIA wife, Valerie Plame. It helps to explain how the commentary about the Wilson affair became so surreal, leading the press, Democratic congressmen and senators, and "professionals" within the intelligence community to suggest that Plame's outing in a leak to columnist Robert Novak had demoralized the intelligence community, quite possibly put Plame and her known foreign contacts into physical jeopardy, and even chilled recruitment efforts by American operatives worldwide. Foreigners, so the theory went, could no longer have confidence in the operational cover protecting their associations with CIA officials after the exposure of Ambassador Wilson's wife.

These hypotheses and conjectures, as it happens, were wildly overstated. There are reasons to be disturbed about what has been revealed in the Wilson-Plame affair, but they are not the reasons we have been told.       

Cover is the Achilles' heel of the Operations Directorate. If you have a basic understanding of CIA cover, you can figure out why the over-the-top charges against the Bush administration in the Wilson matter make no sense. More important, you can get some inkling of why the Operations Directorate has done so poorly against many hard, and not-so-hard, targets in the past (for example, Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs). You will also develop a sinking suspicion that the clandestine service has not been running serious, "unilateral" counterterrorist operations against Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda since 9/11.”


(“Everything you know about the CIA's clandestine work is wrong,” Oct. 27)

 

As usual when the neocons trot out a defensive line, blame here goes to every individual and every entity that can safely be attacked—except to those who participated in planting Valerie Plame’s name in the news media.

 
The Operations Directorate, under attack here, does indeed get reorganized. Part of its non-proliferation mission involves
Iran, and it is safe to conclude that any accurate, objective analysis of Iran could have posed an obstacle in the administration push toward wider war in the Middle East, in which Iran and Syria are still targets.