The push to war continues, with the White House pressing frenetically for passage of the ‘Iraq resolution’ in Congress. The push involves repeated, frantic and bogus claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
October 1-4, 2002:

Oct. 1, 2002 -- A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is published by the National Intelligence Officer of CIA: Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. The NIE includes the item about Niger uranium but not as a reason for thinking Saddam is reconstituting nuclear weapons programs. The NIE, which devotes some space and attention to the Niger uranium item, says, “We cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources.”

According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Three aspects of this NIE merit particular attention: It was produced far more quickly than is normal for such documents; it went far beyond the consensus intelligence assessments of the preceding five years; and, it had more serious dissents to its key findings than any other declassified NIE.”

The Carnegie Endowment analysis also notes differences between the declassified NIE and the classified NIE released publicly the following July; one difference is that leaving out phrases like “we assess” changes a statement from opinion (in the classified NIE, withheld) to fact (in the declassified NIE given to the public in fall 2002).

The INR dissents from the NIE, in “INR’s Alternative View: Iraq’s Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes,” saying that “the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly dubious.” However, the INR dissent is inadvertently misplaced into a box of text connected to the aluminum tubes story. (SSCI Report, 53)

For want of a stapler, a country was lost. The haste, conformity and critical mistakes at the last minute are all obvious signs of administration pressure and were predictable consequences of the pressure.

Same day -- Bush gives press remarks after a meeting with members of Congress, to stress the importance of passing the ‘Iraq resolution’ promptly:

 
“My question is, what's changed? Why would Congress want to weaken a resolution? This guy's had four years to lie, deceive, to arm up. He's had four years to thumb his nose at the world. He is stockpiling more weapons. So I'm not sure why members would like to weaken the resolution.”

Oct. 1, 2002 – George F. Will’s column of the day begins,

“Hitler found "Lord Haw Haw" -- William Joyce, who broadcast German propaganda to Britain during the Second World War -- in the dregs of British extremism. But Saddam Hussein finds American collaborators among senior congressional Democrats.”

(“Innocents Abroad,” Washington Post A21)

These and similar columns, produced full tilt by administration supporters operating through the news media,  create a continuing backdrop for the upcoming fall 2002 elections. Almost all major GOP candidates for office support war with Iraq, using the pro-war campaign as an assist in their drive to retain Congress. Ironically, some of the same media figures using Iraq as a platform plank against Democratic candidates around the clock in 2002 will accuse Democrats of “playing politics” with the war by calling for withdrawal in 2007.

Oct. 2, 2002 – Bush appears with Congressional leaders in the Rose Garden to announce that the White House and Congress have agreed on language for the ‘Iraq resolution,’ and again touts the extreme threat purportedly represented by Iraq:

“On its present course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. We know the treacherous history of the regime. It has waged a war against its neighbors; it has sponsored and sheltered terrorists; it has developed weapons of mass death; it has used them against innocent men, women and children. We know the designs of the Iraqi regime. In defiance of pledges to the U.N., it has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons. It is rebuilding the facilities used to make those weapons.”

Oct. 4, 2002 – CIA officers testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. CIA officers are asked whether they agreed with the British dossier on Iraq’s weapons programs. The National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs replies that “they put more emphasis on the uranium acquisition in Africa than we would.” (SSCI Report, 54)

Same day -- The National Security Council sends over to the White House a sixth draft of a speech for Bush to deliver in Cincinnati. This draft includes the line, “and the regime has been caught attempting to purchase up to 500 metric tons of uranium oxide from Africa – an essential ingredient in the enrichment process.”

Same day – CIA publishes an unclassified White Paper, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, on which the CIA began work in spring 2002, long before the fall 2002 NIE. The White Paper does not include any mention of the Niger uranium item, obviously because CIA analysts did not consider it credible.

Oct. 4, 2002 – Charles Krauthammer’s column, titled “The Myth of U.N. Support,” opposes waiting for the U.N. Security Council to support war against Iraq. (Washington Post A29)