The administration push to war continues, abetted by major media outlets.
    September 15-21, 2002:

Sept. 15, 2002 – The Washington Post runs an article titled “In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil Is Key Issue: U.S. Drillers Eye Huge Petroleum Pool,” pointing out that a post-Saddam Iraq would mean a “bonanza for American oil companies long banished from Iraq.” (Washington Post, front page)

Mid-September, 2002 – The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requests an NIE, a National Intelligence Estimate, on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Senators express concern that they will be expected to vote on an Iraq war resolution soon and have no NIE on which to base their vote. Next day, CIA Director George Tenet orders that drafting of the NIE begin.

Sept. 15, 2002 – Director of the National Economic Council Lawrence B. Lindsey, interviewed by the Wall Street Journal, estimates the cost of an Iraq war at 1-2 percent of Gross Domestic Product, or $200 billion upward.

This figure is criticized as excessive by OMB director and Bush loyalist Mitchell Daniels, who estimates the war cost at $50 billion to $60 billion. Daniels’ estimate is endorsed by Donald Rumsfeld, and Lawrence Lindsey is derided behind the scenes by unnamed administration figures who make negative remarks about his weight, in the presence of reporters. Daniels, heading the OMB, is a longtime Bush loyalist and also the boss over Cheney son-in-law Philip Perry, OMB Counsel.

Same day – George F. Will argues that there is nothing hasty about Bush’s push for Iraq regime change:

“On Dec. 2, 1999, President Bush said the trigger for preemptive action against Iraq should be not just Iraq's acquisition of such weapons but Iraqi progress in "developing" them. Hence the importance of evidence that Iraq, which has endured sanctions costing it upward of $ 200 billion rather than permit weapons inspections, has been buying hardware necessary for developing nuclear weapons.    

          Those who are most skeptical about the justification for military action to depose Hussein pass over his possession of chemical and biological weapons and ask: Is his acquisition of nuclear weapons "imminent"?”

(“It's Not Too Late,” Washington Post B7)

Sept. 16, 2002 – Iraq announces that it will allow U.N. inspectors to enter Iraq without any conditions.

This announcement is met with no fanfare by the White House, which rushes out a ‘report’ next day to denigrate it, see below. In retrospect, it is clear that any move by Iraq through diplomatic channels is headed off or contested, by an administration bent on war with Iraq.

Sept. 16, 2002 – The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Douglas Feith) provides the prior flawed Iraq-al Qaeda briefing (from August 8 and 15) again, to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and to Lewis Libby, Cheney’s chief of staff. The ‘Policy Counter Terror Evaluation Group’ (PCTEG) ceases to exist soon after this briefing.

Apparently none of these briefings about a purported al Qaeda-Saddam partnership discuss the detailed contradictions from other offices debunking the theory.

Sept. 17, 2002 – The White House issues another press release, with a timeline titled “Saddam Hussein’s Continuing Deception and Defiance.” This one comes in response to Iraq’s announcement that U.N. inspections will be resumed in Iraq:

 
“We’ve heard ‘unconditional’ before.”

 

Sept. 18, 2002 -- The president and vice president have a breakfast meeting with Congressional leaders as part of the long jawboning process to get to war.

Sept. 19, 2002 – Bush sends the ‘Iraq resolution’ to Congress, still absent a crisis from Iraq, and speaks in a joint appearance with Secretary of State Colin Powell:

 
“At the United Nations Security Council it is very important that the members understand that the credibility of the United Nations is at stake, that the Security Council must be firm in its resolve to deal with a truth threat to world peace, and that is Saddam Hussein. That the United Nations Security Council must work with the United States and Britain and other concerned parties to send a clear message that we expect Saddam to disarm. And if the United Nations Security Council won't deal with the problem, the United States and some of our friends will.”

Sept. 19, 2002 – Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld testifies to the Senate Armed Services Committee: “No terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people than the regime of Saddam Hussein.”

Same day – George F. Will brings out another one, “Stuck to the U.N. Tar Baby,” disparaging the U.N. (Washington Post A27)

Sept. 20, 2002 – Charles Krauthammer argues in his syndicated column,

 
“There is something deeply deranged about the Iraq debate.     

          The vice president, followed by the administration A Team and echoing the president, argues that we must remove from power an irrational dictator who has a history of aggression and mass murder, is driven by hatred of America and is developing weapons of mass destruction that could kill millions of Americans in a day. The Democrats respond with public skepticism, a raised eyebrow and the charge that the administration has yet to "make the case."

(“Is This the Way To Decide on Iraq?”)