Jan. 24, 2003 – Upon a request from Steve Hadley, Deputy National Security Director, at NSC about WMDs, the CIA “faxed a packet of background information to the NSC,” including the uranium item. (Libby trial document DX18)

Same day -- The DIA provides a background paper on the Niger item to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs, without caveats or warnings that the item may be false.

Same day -- Judith Miller publishes another article on Iraq in the New York Times:

“Having concluded that international inspectors are unlikely to find tangible and irrefutable evidence that Iraq is hiding weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration is preparing its own assessment that will rely heavily on evidence from Iraqi defectors, according to senior administration officials.        

       Former Iraqi scientists, military officers and contractors have provided American intelligence agencies with a portrait of Saddam Hussein's secret programs to develop and conceal chemical, biological and nuclear weapons that is starkly at odds with the findings so far of the United Nations weapons inspectors.”

(“Defectors Bolster U.S. Case Against Iraq, Officials Say,” A11)

In due course, the defectors will prove to be flawed sources, and the U.N. weapons inspectors will be vindicated.

Jan. 26, 2003 -- Secretary of State Colin Powell gives a speech at the World Economic Forum, asking why Saddam was still trying to purchase uranium. (SSCI Report, 63-64)

Jan. 26, 2003 – The British Observer reports that the U.S. is buying Iraqi oil more frantically than ever, trying to stock up before the war:

“Facing its most chronic shortage in oil stocks for 27 years, the US has this month turned to an unlikely source of help – Iraq.

          Weeks before a prospective invasion of Iraq, the oil-rich state has doubled its exports of oil to America . . .

       But, in the run-up to war, the US oil majors will this week report a big leap in profits. ChevronTexaco is to report a 300 percent rise. Chevron used to employ the hawkish Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s National Security Adviser, as a member of its board.”

(“US Buys Up Iraqi Oil to Stave off Crisis”)

Jan. 27, 2003 – A CIA intelligence report indicates that a foreign government service has reported that a uranium sodium compound stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin, is destined for France, not Iraq. (SSCI Report, 64)

Same day – One day before the State of the Union speech, “the DCI was provided with a hardcopy draft of the State of the Union address at an NSC meeting” to vet. However, Tenet testifies to Congress in July, 2003, that he never read the speech; no one recalls who the contact person for the speech was, if there was one. There was at least one phone conversation between the NSC and the intelligence analysts about the uranium language, but no one can remember who initiated the call, and there are disagreements about the draft wording. No one remembers who the contact person for the speech was, if there was one. (SSCI Report, 64)

Jan. 28, 2003 – President Bush gives the State of the Union address including the infamous “sixteen words” on Niger uranium:

“The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.”

Continuing,

    “The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax -- enough doses to kill several million people. He hasn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it.      

    The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure. He hadn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it.

    Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He's not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

    U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them -- despite Iraq's recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them.”

Once again, the double bind: it would be difficult to provide evidence of something gone.

Meanwhile, the entire saga of the bogus Niger uranium item demonstrates administration practice toward the Intelligence Community: at every juncture, they used the bully pulpit to apply pressure. The tactic is simple, if ham-handed; you just make your assertions public, and then your intelligence agencies can choose between backing up their president or exposing him.

At about the time of the State of the Union address, Italy's SISMI also warns again that the Niger documents are not reliable. An opposition senator in Italy’s parliament later says that SISMI analyzed the documents some time between October 2002 and January 2003.

As of January 2008, it would be helpful to inquire into exactly what SISMI knew and when it informed the administration, as it clearly did more than once.