Continuation of blog series on the lead-up to invading Iraq. The second week of February is as busy as the first, for the administration.

Feb. 8-14, 2002:

 
 

Feb. 12, 2002 – The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) writes up a finished intelligence report that concludes that “Iraq probably is searching abroad for natural uranium to assist in its nuclear weapons program,” but does not include any judgments about the credibility of the reporting. This DIA report is based on the same limited material as the CIA report a week earlier.

 
These reports are insufficient for the White House objective of generating grounds for war with Iraq.

 

 
Feb. 13, 2002 – After seeing the DIA report, Vice President Cheney asks his CIA briefer for analysis regarding the item on Iraq’s alleged attempt to purchase uranium from Niger: “Briefer’s Tasking for Richard Cheney on 2/13/2002,” briefer David T. Terry.

 
The declassified part of the memo, issued from the Office of Deputy Director for Intelligence, President’s Analytic Support Staff, reads as follows:

 
“Tasking:

The VP was shown an assessment (he thought from DIA) that Iraq is purchasing uranium from Africa. He would like our assessment of that transaction and its implications for Iraq’s nuclear program. A memo for tomorrow’s book would be great.”

http://wid.ap.org/documents/libbytrial/feb8/GX30301.PDF

 

Feb. 14, 2002 – Following up the Directorate of Operations report of Feb. 5 and responding to Cheney’s request for information on Feb. 13, CIA publishes a Senior Power Executive Intelligence Brief (SPWR) about the Niger uranium story: “Iraq-Niger: Possible Sale of Uranium From Niger to Iraq and its Implications for Baghdad’s Nuclear Program [deleted].”

 
This memorandum for the Vice President conveys doubts about the story. It concludes,

 
“Information on the alleged uranium contract between Iraq and Niger comes exclusively from a foreign government service report that lacks crucial details, and we are working to clarify the information and to determine whether it can be corroborated.”

 
It goes on, “The report claims Niger in July 2000 signed a contract to supply Iraq annually with 500 tons of uranium – most likely yellowcake – that would be a significant percentage of the reported 4,000 tons of uranium mined annually in Niger.”

 
Furthermore, “Some of the information in the report contradicts reporting from the US Embassy in Niamey [Niger]. US diplomats say the French Government-led consortium that operates Niger’s two uranium mines maintains complete control over uranium mining and yellowcake production. The Embassy says the consortium – which includes Spanish and Japanese firms – purchases Niger’s entire annual production of 3,000 tons, as opposed to the 4,000 tons cited in the report.”

 
“Yellowcake” is unprocessed uranium, which must be processed before it can be used. Cheney’s briefing report continues, “If converted to feed material and enriched, 500 tons of yellowcake could be used to produce enough weapons-grade material for some 50 nuclear devices.” – a frightening prospect, but Iraq did not have the means to process the uranium.

 
Also, uranium in Iraq’s custody had already been inspected, and the inspectors knew where it was:

“The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says Iraq already has some 550 tons of yellowcake – some 200 tons of which were purchased in 1978 from Niger – but the material remains in sealed containers subject to annual IAEA inspection.”

 
The annual inspections have continued, and this report given to Cheney concludes:

“The IAEA conducted its most recent inspection last month and has officially verified that the container seals were intact. [deleted]”

http://wid.ap.org/documents/libbytrial/feb8/GX30301.PDF

http://wid.ap.org/documents/libbytrial/jan24/DX63.pdf

 

Oddly, on this date CIA seems still not to have the originals of the forgeries, apparently not obtained until much later. The reasonable inference is that CIA knew or suspected from the start that the documents were not worth much. Otherwise, CIA would have bent all means to get the originals from the first. For whatever reasons, the agency is not able or willing to communicate evidence of the falsity of the documents to administration officials.

 

Same day -- An internet periodical named Intelligence Online publishes a report on “a new service in the Defense Department specializing in using lobbying tactics with military operations, the Office of Strategic Influence.”

 
The item will subsequently be picked up by the New York Times. The Office of Strategic Influence is perceived as a blatant instance of boosting war through propaganda and is exposed in one of the biggest media markets in the nation. It will have to be officially disbanded, though its functions are carried on.