The push to Iraq, uninterrupted by the holiday season, continues throughout winter and spring, from the very beginning of 2002, and will last the entire calendar year.

January, 2002:

Jan. 18, 2002 – President Bush determines that captured Talibani and Al Qaeda are not protected by the Geneva POW Convention.

Jan. 19, 2002 – Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issues a memorandum ordering the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform combat commanders that “Al Qaeda and Taliban individuals . . . are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”

Jan. 22, 2002 – The Office of Legal Counsel issues a memorandum from Jay S. Bybee for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees. This Bybee memo reinforces the Yoo-Delahunty memo. One effect of the memos is to make it more difficult to pierce the administrative veil to investigate mistakes and abuses in the terrorist dragnet.

Cumulatively these memos will contribute later to abuses at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, further inflaming distrust and resentment of the U.S. there and throughout the Middle East. At home, the memos may constitute red meat for some sectors of the president’s political base; their effect abroad, aside from the harm done to detainees innocent of terrorism, is mostly gasoline on the flames.

Another effect of the memos is to help conceal mistakes or abuses in the terrorist dragnet. Most detainees are later cleared, often after years of delay, and are returned to their home countries.

Jan. 22, 2002 – Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz sends a memo to Douglas Feith, fishing for a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda: “SUBJECT: Iraq Connections to Al Qaida”:

“We don’t seem to be making much progress pulling together intelligence on links between Iraq and Al Qaida.

We owe SecDef some analysis of this subject. Please give me a recommendation on how best to proceed. Appreciate the short turn-around. Thanks.”

Jan. 23, 2002 – President Bush sends another Iraq letter to Congress, again in absence of a crisis:

“Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate

January 23, 2002

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I am providing a report prepared by my Administration on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council. The last report, consistent with Public Law 102-1, was transmitted on October 11, 2001.

Sincerely,      GEORGE W. BUSH”

Jan. 23, 2002 – Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl disappears in Pakistan. Speculation is that Pearl has been trying to follow up connections between the Pakistani government, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan’s intelligence service, or ISI), and terrorism.

Jan. 24, 2002 – Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, sends a memo to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in response to a Wolfowitz inquiry about links between Saddam Hussein and terrorists. The response is wishful:

“So far, we have discovered few direct links. However, we have uncovered evidence suggesting more robust indirect links. This is not surprising given the denial and concealment strategies employed by Saddam’s intelligence service.”

At this stage in early 2002, Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld are particularly eager to have one of their big three allegations against Saddam pan out – the alleged link with Islamist guerrillas, ‘al Qaeda’ if possible, anyone else in a pinch; the alleged use of aluminum tubes for missile development; and/or the alleged purchase of uranium from Niger. Some of this heightened interest in finding allegations that will stick is probably preparation for the coming mini-campaign against Iraq on March 11, the six-month anniversary of 9/11.

Jan. 25, 2002 -- White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales sends a memo to President Bush regarding his presidential decision of Jan.18. The legal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell has objected, but Gonzales advises Bush that “there are reasonable grounds for you to conclude” that the Geneva Convention “does not apply . . . to the conflict with the Taliban.”