Leading to Iraq: High crimes and misdemeanors. December 2001, continued.
Blog series chronicling the
administration push to war with Iraq.
December 15-31,
2001:
Dec. 17,
2001 (about) – The battle of Tora Bora, Afghanistan, ends with the last cave
complex being taken by the U.S. Significant Islamist partisans including
al-Qaeda figures and Osama bin Laden, however, seem to have escaped; in any
event, they are not captured. Bin Laden, whose voice reportedly was heard on
audiotape as recently as December 14, is thought to have escaped through the
mountains into Pakistan. There is more than one
indication that the White House and its political allies in media and elsewhere
have already shifted their attention and emphasis away from Afghanistan to Iraq; see below.
Dec. 19, 2001 – Gen. Franks presents a further
redone Iraq war plan to Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, who again tells him to redo it.
Dec. 20, 2001 – The New York Times publishes
a Page One article by Judith Miller alleging ongoing production of WMD by Saddam
Hussein:
“An Iraqi defector who described himself as a civil
engineer said he personally worked on renovations of secret facilities for
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in underground wells, private villas
and under the Saddam Hussein Hospital in Baghdad as recently as a year ago.
The defector, Adnan Ihsan Saeed
al-Haideri, gave details of the projects he said he worked on for President
Saddam Hussein's government in an extensive interview last week in Bangkok.” (“A Nation Challenged: SECRET
SITES; Iraqi Tells of Renovations at Sites for Chemical and Nuclear Arms,”
front page)
Defectors
cited here and elsewhere by the administration, in regard to Saddam’s WMD
capabilities, ultimately wash out as reliable or current sources. This article
is among several that have alleged an apparently massive and almost
undiscriminating renovation of WMD capability by Saddam, sprinkling facilities
geared toward bioweapons, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons throughout the
Iraqi infrastructure. In retrospect, it is sad that these claims did not draw
more scrutiny if only for their ramshackle multiplicity.
On this particular date, so close to
Christmas and so soon after 9/11, undoubtedly most Americans were reluctant to
think about attacking Iraq and thus were also unready to contemplate the
administration’s increasingly clear intent to attack.
Dec. 22, 2001 – The U.S.-backed interim
government of Hamid Karzai takes office in Afghanistan, replacing the presidency of ethnic
Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former
president of Afghanistan. This
means, as commentators in the foreign press observe, that now both the
President of Afghanistan and the U.S.
ambassador to Afghanistan are
former employees of Unocal.
Dec.
27, 2001 – A videotape showing Osama bin Laden is released.
In this tape, apparently new, Bin Laden is shown gaunt and graying.
Same day – SecDef Donald Rumsfeld gives a press
conference at the Pentagon. When asked about bin Laden, Rumsfeld brushes him off. Responding to questions about whether it is necessary to bring bin Laden in, dead or alive, Rumsfeld says:
“We hear six, seven, eight, ten, twelve conflicting reports every day.
I've stopped chasing them. We do know of certain knowledge that he is either in
Afghanistan or in some other country or
dead. (Laughter) And we know of certain knowledge that we don't know, which of
those happens to be the case. With respect to the second part of your question,
our goals have been stated very clearly, and that they are that we want to stop
the terrorist networks in the world, including al-Qaida, but not just al-Qaida.
And to do that, you have to go after those networks and root them out; and
second, you have to go after the countries that harbor them.”
This use
of the word “harbor,” as we now know, is a brilliant rhetorical device to
justify attacking countries that have not attacked us. The pretext initiated
here, of course, is that Iraq ‘harbors’ al-Qaeda or Islamist fundamentalists,
another administration claim that proves false.
Dec. 28, 2001 – Gen. Franks, having come to Crawford, Texas, briefs Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld,
Powell, Rice and others on the Iraq war plan.
Dec. 31, 2001 (about) – An article
in Business Week dated December 31 lays out Paul Wolfowitz’ track record in
the administration and his open aims on Iraq:
“Wolfowitz' position on Iraq was
forged long before September 11: He advocated helping oust Saddam in 1991 and
was one of the first voices to favor taking on Serb dictator Slobodan
Milosevic. Wolfowitz also hews to a hard line on the need to defend Taiwan
against a possible invasion from China.
"When anything happens, he always assumes that it must be solved by the U.S.
military," says Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International
Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing.”
Dec. 31, 2001 – Zalmay Khalilzad, promoted
again, becomes Bush’s Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan. As
the official
announcement reads,
“Dr. Khalilzad headed the
Bush-Cheney Transition team for the Department of Defense and has been a
Counselor to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Between 1993 and 1999, Dr.
Khalilzad was Director of the Strategy, Doctrine and Force Structure program
for RAND's Project Air Force. While with RAND, he founded the Center for
Middle Eastern Studies. Between 1991 and 1992, Dr. Khalilzad served as
Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. He also served as a
senior political scientist at RAND and an associate professor at the University of California at San Diego in 1989 and 1991. From 1985 to
1989 at the Department of State, Dr. Khalilzad served as Special Advisor to the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, advising on the Iran-Iraq War
and the Soviet War in Afghanistan. From 1979 to 1989, Dr.
Khalilzad was an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. Dr. Khalilzad holds a Ph.D.
from the University of Chicago (1979).”