May 8, 2002 – In what might be a setback for the White House and the Office of the Vice President, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), in the Department of State, provides an assessment of Iraq WMD and missile programs that throws cold water on the hype:

 
“There have been provocative allegations of Iraqi nuclear activities, such as an alleged contract for the provision of uranium from Niger, but we regard such information as questionable.”

May 8, 2002 – Iraq resumes its oil exports after suspending exports for a month in protest of Palestinian policy. Most of the oil exports are destined for the U.S., as M.E.E.S. reports on May 13.

 
One of the eager U.S. customers for Iraq petroleum is Condoleezza Rice’s former company, Chevron, which later settles with the SEC and agrees to pay fines of $30 million in an investigation of the illegal kickbacks to the Iraqi regime.

Same day – Bush meets with King Abdallah of Jordan. These meetings with foreign leaders are largely billed in press releases and in meetings with reporters as discussions about relations between Israel and Palestine, although little in the way of a new ‘road map’ comes from them. The grain of truth in this representation is that other Middle Eastern nations try to negotiate a commitment from the administration on support for a Palestinian state. Apparently they neglect to nail down a time frame.

May 10, 2002 – The CIA Directorate of Intelligence produces a Principals Committee briefing book that updates the reporting on purported Iraq WMD. The briefing book mentions the Niger uranium item, but without drawing any conclusions about it. (SSCI Report, 48)

 
The noncommittal mention further reinforces earlier signs that CIA never was too convinced of the weightiness of that purported Iraq-Niger uranium deal.

 
May 10-11, 2002 -- Gen. Tommy Franks and the War Council – Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell and Rice -- hold a two-day meeting about Iraq war plans.

May 10, 2002 – A PowerPoint slide presentation on Iraq war plans prepared by CentCom for briefings of senior officials demonstrates how far the plans have progressed at this point. The American public is still kept in the dark about the fact that the plans are being drawn up at all.

 
The Operational Concept also demonstrates some gaps between estimates and reality. The Pentagon estimates that a total of 225 days, in three attack phases, will be required to accomplish “complete regime destruction” in Iraq, a gross overestimate of the time actually required. On the other hand, the duration of Phase IV of the plan, or “post-hostilities,” is given as “unknown” or “months,” but the Operational Concept assumes that almost all U.S. troops will be re-deployed out of Iraq by the end of 2006. Part of the disconnect here is the apparent assumption that Iraq will stabilize readily after the Saddam government is destroyed.

 
But the plan also demonstrates a gap between the Pentagon and the White House. Regardless of what is desired by the White House and the Office of the Vice President, capturing Iraq into perpetuity, or for the next 30 years, seems not to be envisioned by the Pentagon. The U.S. Army is not at this point drawing up plans for operating as a permanent substitute government and infrastructure for Iraq. These PowerPoint slides cast an ironic reflection on subsequent criticisms of the Pentagon for lack of ‘planning.’ The White House at this point has not clarified to the military that it intends to control Iraq permanently after the removal of Saddam.

May 13, 2002 – Agence France Presse reports that the administration is stepping up its contacts with Iraqi opposition groups.

In its issue dated May 13, 2002, Time Magazine provides a big PR splash for the war plans: “Inside Saddam's World; The U.S. likes to portray Iraq's regime as shaky. But TIME's reporting inside Iraq suggests Saddam isn't losing his grip” “Inside Saddam's World; What Saddam's Got, Much of his chemical and biological weaponry remains unaccounted for, and he's working nukes, by Josh Tyrangiel..” “Inside Saddam's World; "We're Taking Him Out", His war on Iraq may be delayed, but Bush still vows to remove Saddam. Here's a look at White House plans.”

Uncork the champagne.

 
May 14, 2002 – The U.N. adopts the “smart sanctions” proposal, Resolution 1409, supported by Secretary of State Colin Powell. The resolution eases some restrictions on Iraq's ability to import civilian goods while preventing Iraq from importing or building weapons of mass destruction.

Powell’s support of ‘smart sanctions’ against Iraq is widely perceived as a stance at odds with the White House. The diplomatic approach to helping the Iraqi people is antithetical to administration strategies, whether indirect efforts to arm insurgents and exiles against Saddam, or – more often, and more definitely – the direct route of invading Iraq and removing Saddam by force.

Even these more limited sanctions still injure the Iraqi people. The entire thrust of the sanctions, from the 1990s under the Clinton administration through early 2003 under Bush, was effectively to weaken the Iraqi people, making them that much more susceptible to the iron grasp of Saddam.

[Putting it all together, the best plan to get the U.S. out of Iraq evidently must start with excluding U.S. oil companies from commerce in Iraqi oil. If U.S. oil companies were not involved, the political will would be found to get U.S. troops out of Iraq.]