Leading to Iraq: High crimes and misdemeanors. April, 2002, continued.
Continuation of blog series on the push to invade Iraq. The administration continues behind-the-scene efforts that tend to revolve around oil-rich countries. As in the previous post, administration acts reflected below in Venezuela parallel those in Iraq. Meanwhile, the president and other senior officials continue an all-points effort to enlist heads of state of other nations in support of war. Almost all of this is masked from the general public.
Late April, 2002:
Apr. 13, 2002 – The Iraqi regime stops all oil exports under the U.N. Oil-for-Food program. From April 13 through May 10, no Iraqi oil is exported to customers, who are mainly U.S. oil companies.
Apr. 14, 2002 – The CIA sends around a “Spot Commentary” outlining the political situation in Venezuela, including thousands of protestors in the streets demanding the return of Chavez. The commentary makes clear that the coup against Chavez lacked popular validation:
“Escalating public protests and signs that his military support was flagging prompted Interim President Pedro Carmona to resign late Saturday night . . . Media reports indicate that tens of thousands of protestors began surrounding the presidential palace late Saturday demanding Chavez’s return . . . Carmona’s support unraveled quickly yesterday as political parties, labor unions, and the military sensed he was moving too quickly and without their consultation.”
Larger implications in this coup episode include another black eye for America in public perception around the globe when administration complicity becomes known. Some lack of esteem can be inferred from the widespread suspicion even before documentation comes out. Regrettably, the suspicion voiced widely abroad gets too little attention at home, where a GOP-dominated Congress and malleable corporate outlets tend to downplay or to trivialize it. Had more information about Venezuela, Elliot Abrams, and the meetings of coup leaders with Otto Reich in Washington, D.C., become widely available, the U.S. public might have been better able to ward off the propaganda drive to Iraq.
More immediately, this Spot Commentary suggests that in Caracas as in Baghdad, the U.S. Intelligence Community lacks boots on the ground. Rather than firsthand observation from the street, the writer here seems to be relying on newspaper reports. Furthermore, the writer goes on to say (hopefully) that Chavez’s “rumored” return to office will only lead to further unrest, a prediction not fulfilled.
The chief language of Venezuela is Spanish, and many Venezuelans speak English: a lack of personnel skilled in less-taught languages is not the only determinant in our lack of intelligence from inside the Middle East.
Apr. 17, 2002 – The CIA issues another Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) with material on Venezuela. The administration is backing a plan for the Organization of American States to send a “democracy mission” to Venezuela, but some of Venezuela’s neighbors are leery of this mission, saying that constitutional order has already been restored there. Under the heading “Latin America: Split over Venezuela,” the SEIB gives a quick run-down of Latin American governments that might be willing to side with the U.S. administration against Chavez, and those that would not be willing. The coalition of the possibly willing in Latin America includes most prominently Colombia, the nation informally known as a haven for former Nazi collaborators after World War II.
As the SEIB concludes,
“Regardless of the OAS mission’s fate, the region’s quick rejection of the Venezuelan coup—and its stunning collapse—will give pause to other cliques considering moves against embattled or unpopular governments. Latin governments voted overwhelmingly to invoke the OAS Democratic Charter and levy economic sanctions against the Carmona government, and they issued a Rio Group statement condemning the coup.”
Apr. 20, 2002 – Gen. Franks meets with Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld and Rice about the Iraq war plan.
Apr. 25, 2002 – Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia meets with President Bush at the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas, reportedly for five hours. Indirect indications are that Bush is pressing for Saudi support for war against Iraq, and the Saudis are driving a hard bargain, asking for firm U.S. commitment on a Palestinian state and relief for the Palestinians under Israel. Bush tells reporters afterward that he and Abdullah have a “strong personal bond” and “share a vision.”
Apr. 25, 2002 – Under court order, the Department of Energy releases its Vaughn index, the list of documents it has not turned over pertaining to Cheney’s Energy Task Force of spring 2001.
Apr. 26, 2002 – General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief of U.S. CENTCOM, meets in London with British defense heads and gives a press conference:
“Q: Could I ask you, although there’s no political decision, are you making contingency plans for any possible military action in Iraq?
Franks: I will tell you at this point that I don’t think decisions have been made, certainly in my own country, about future operations in Iraq. What we have done is we have started to talk together, to think about where we are today with Saddam Hussein’s regime and I think policy level discussions will continue both in Washington and in London, and we will wait to see what decisions may be made at some point in the future.”
Same day – Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, on a tour of Central Asia and Afghanistan, arrives in Kyrgyzstan to shore up support for the war on terror.