Leading to Iraq: High crimes and misdemeanors. Second week of March, 2002.
The spring campaign for war continues, intensifying
around the mini-event of March 11, 2002, the six months anniversary of
9/11.
March 8-11, 2002:
March
8, 2002
– The Directorate of Operations in CIA first disseminates a memo or report,
“[deleted] Nigerien Denial of Uranium Yellowcake Sales to Rogue States,” citing
“A contact with excellent access who does not have an established reporting
record.” The “contact with excellent access” is Joseph Wilson. The full report
debunks any probability of a current/recent deal for sale of Niger unprocessed uranium to Iraq.
http://wid.ap.org/documents/libbytrial/jan23/DX71.pdf
http://wid.ap.org/documents/libbytrial/jan29/DX439.pdf
March 10, 2002 – Cheney leaves for a 10-nation
trip to the Middle
East to
try to garner support in the governments of Persian Gulf states and Israel for war against Iraq.
March 11, 2002 – Contradicting later claims by
the administration that it never tried to link Saddam Hussein to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the administration uses
ceremonies and public appearances on this date, the six-month anniversary of
9/11, to push against Iraq. Top administration officials
fan out in a series of public statements incorporating references to Iraq. Bush alludes to Iraq in a ceremonial press
opportunity at the White House. Statements by Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and
Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) echo administration concern with Iraq. The Pentagon announces that the
U.S. must prepare to counter development of nuclear
weapons in a list of countries including Iraq, a statement repeated on air by
radio host Paul Harvey among others.
Same day -- Vice President Cheney and
British Prime Minister Tony Blair appear jointly in London, where Cheney has traveled to
enlist British support en route to the Middle East to do the same with Muslim
nations. Tony Blair helpfully echoes the administration mantra, 'weapons of mass destruction':
“BLAIR: We've also said, again, right from the
outset, that the threat of weapons of mass destruction will have to be
addressed.
In the House of Commons statement
I made just a few days after the 11th of September, I said that these issues had
to be addressed because, of course, Al Qaeda would use chemical or biological
or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction if they could. And I also said that
there were some groups or some states who trade the technology and capability
for such weapons.
I said at that time that it was
right that this (inaudible) was exposed, disrupted and stamped out. And that
remains our position.
No decisions, of course, have
been taken yet on how we proceed. But this is a time when we discuss how
important it is that the issue of weapons of mass destruction is properly dealt
with.”
“CHENEY: Thank you, Prime Minister.
I'm delighted to be here today in London and have the opportunity to meet
with the prime minister and his associates. This is the first stop on an important
trip to the Middle
East.
And the president wanted to make sure I checked in first with the prime
minister before I went down to a part of the world that he knows so well and
where we've worked together so effectively I think over the years.
Of course, this is six months to
the day since we were attacked in New York and at the Pentagon, and I
think, more than ever, the Americans appreciate the depth of the relationship
with our British allies. Many Brits died along side thousands of Americans on
September 11. We have mourned our losses together. And at this hour, we engage
the enemy together . . .
Today, in Washington President
Bush will welcome to the White House representatives of the United Kingdom and more than 100 other
countries that have joined the global effort to defeat terror. For their
commitment and for their sacrifices, we will give thanks -- thanks to the
American people -- and we will express the continuing resolve of our coalition
for a long campaign to deny terrorists sanctuary anywhere in the world.
Tomorrow, I head to Jordan, the first of 11 middle eastern
countries on this trip, and with the governments of that region I will be
discussing the current actions of the coalition. We will confer as well about
the threat of weapons of mass destruction and the important choices that await
us in the days ahead. In these matters, America is not announcing decisions.
I'll be there to conduct frank discussions and to solicit the views of
important friends and allies.”
As
usual, the two leaders get a helpful question from sympathetic press:
“QUESTION: Could I ask both leaders about the second
phase of the war against terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction issue?
What evidence can you lay before
the world that Saddam Hussein does have or shortly will have the capability to
threaten not only his own people, but countries in Western Europe and, indeed, the United States itself?”
Same day -- Convenient stories pertaining
to Iraq appear in a gamut of media
outlets. After long media silence, rumors or reports arise that Commander
Michael Speicher, missing in action since the Gulf War, is speculated to be
held alive in Iraq; this item, reported by the rightwing Washington Times, is brought up even during the State Department
daily press briefing. Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS) appears on television, saying
there is no evidence that Speicher died in 1991. Market reports in business
media say that Iraq’s refusal to let nuclear
inspectors enter Iraq unconditionally is driving up U.S. oil prices. Mort Kondracke of Roll Call says that the White House
ceremony will rally Americans in favor of the coalition against Iraq. Fred Barnes of the Weekly Standard says that other
countries will support decisive U.S. action to get rid of Saddam
Hussein.
However,
this early launch against Iraq – quite probably too obvious
even by post-9/11 standards -- is premature. Generally, outside the rightwing
think tanks and their publications, response to the PR blitz ranges from
unenthusiastic to negative. By the next day, March 12, European nations are
openly demurring at moves against Iraq and rejecting linkage with 9/11,
Tony Blair is busily backpedaling in Britain, and Arab nations are protesting
vigorously against the idea of a U.S. war against Iraq.
The administration, obviously realizing that it has more
work to do, keeps plugging away with anti-Saddam speeches and remarks for the
next year, see below.
The White House must have craved that Niger uranium-Iraq item to seal the
deal on this special day, March 11 – which would explain the flurry of
high-level administration interest in Niger particularly in February 2002.
The round robin of ceremonial appearances linking ‘Iraq’ to 9/11, via commemoration of
the six-month anniversary, would have been spiced up and given heft by an
intelligence claim about forthcoming Iraqi nukes. The Office of the Vice
President, the State Department and the Pentagon all pursued the Niger story in early 2002, with little
to no encouragement from the Intelligence Community, see below.
All this would also help explain the administration’s
later extreme angst regarding the Wilsons, who could draw a line connecting
Jan. 2001, Jan. 2002, Jan. 2003 – and even, via March 11, 2002, 9/11 – and thus
clarify among other things how blatantly the administration was willing to use
9/11 to boost war with Iraq.