Continuation of blog series on the lead-up to war with Iraq. The third week of February, 2002, continues busy with behind-the-scenes efforts and a committed public relations campaign through acquiescent media. However, the administration campaign for war is temporarily derailed by an instance of effective reporting in a large newspaper.

Feb. 15-21, 2002:

Feb. 18, 2002 – The U.S. Embassy in Niger, which had previously reported that no Niger uranium was diverted, now cables under pressure that the report warrants another “hard look” at Niger uranium. However, the cable also notes that the “purported 4,000-ton annual production listed is fully 1,000 tons more than the mining companies claim to have produced in 2001.” (SSCI Report, 40)

Feb. 19, 2002 – A meeting convenes at the Counter-Proliferation Division at CIA including CIA and INR analysts and Joseph Wilson, to discuss sending someone to Niger to evaluate the story of Iraq’s attempting to purchase yellowcake/uranium; notes are taken at the meeting by an INR analyst. Valerie Plame later testifies to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee that her husband, Joseph Wilson, was suggested for the trip by a CIA colleague and that she wrote a memo, upon request, supporting the suggestion. Wilson is a former ambassador to Gabon, Africa, who had a posting to Niger early in his career; he is also the last American diplomat to have met Saddam Hussein. The INR expresses skepticism about the alleged uranium contract; INR believes that US Embassy Niger has good contacts. Plame testifies to the Senate staff that when she informs her husband about the trip, she calls the Niger report “crazy.” (SSCI Report, 39)

http://wid.ap.org/documents/libbytrial/jan23/DX71.pdf

Same day – A Pentagon official confirms the existence of an “Office of Strategic Influence” to the New York Times. The front-page Times article, “Hearts and Minds: Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad,” leads to such widespread public outcry that the administration is forced to spend the rest of the month backpedaling, see below.

Feb. 20, 2002 – Joseph Wilson, former envoy to Iraq and former ambassador in Africa, is asked to go to Niger to check out the Iraq-Niger uranium story and accepts. Wilson previously traveled to Africa for the CIA in 1999 but with no report published. The talking points given Wilson for use with Niger do not include specifics on the alleged Niger-Iraq uranium deal. (SSCI Report, 41)

That Wilson is allowed only general talking points – no specifics on the intelligence reports – at the same time that other, higher-level meetings of U.S. and Niger officials take place suggests that the administration did not particularly want Wilson’s trip to uncover anything.

Same day – Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith has a breakfast meeting with reporters to deny that the Office of Strategic Information will lie to Americans. The office is intended for battlefield information campaigns, using information against enemies, Feith says. Feith oversees the office. Feith says that “We have an enormous stake in our credibility, and we're going to preserve that . . . But we're not going to give up on the obvious usefulness of managing information of various types for the purpose of helping our armed forces accomplish their missions.”

Same day – Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, visiting troops stationed to provide security at the Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah, denies that the Pentagon will use lies or disinformation to push the war in America.

 
From the transcript:

Rumsfeld: Well, the Pentagon is not issuing disinformation to the foreign press or any other press.

Q: Will they be?

Rumsfeld: No. The United States of America has long had policies with respect to public information, and we have policies where certainly we make a practice of assuring that what we tell the public is accurate and correct. And if in any event somebody happens to be misinformed and say something that's not correct, they correct that at the earliest opportunity.

The Department of State of the United States of America has an Office of Public Diplomacy, I believe it's called. The Joint Staff has an Office of Information Operations. And the office called SOLIC [Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict] has the office you're referring to, of Strategic Influence.

If you think about it, in the Afghan conflict, for example, or the war on terrorism, we dropped millions of food rations for starving people in Afghanistan. They were in yellow packets, and they were dropped from aircraft. And the Taliban and the al Qaeda were lying to people and telling the Afghan people that in fact that it was poisoned food. It was not poisoned food; it was wonderful food. It was culturally appropriate food. So we have an information operation where we explained -- dropped leaflets explaining to the Afghan people that it was very good food.

There was also a problem where there was same -- similar-colored packets that had some bomblets in them, and we dropped leaflets explaining the difference. And we have a Commando Solo, which is a radio ship aircraft that flies over and drops -- we drop leaflets, for example, offering rewards for the capture of various al Qaeda. And all of that is part of this strategic influence or information operations. The word "deception" is an interesting one because it would be wrong to use the word in any context other than a strategic or tactical deception. For example, if the Special Forces of the United States were getting ready to (whoop laughter) -- Oh, we got some partisans here! Way to go! Let's all do it for the Special Forces! (Audience whoops; isolated off-mike yelled statement; Secretary Rumsfeld laughs).

Over the next several days, there are numerous news reports about the Office of Strategic Information, with numerous editorials against it. The outcry does not cease, and within another week the office will be gone.

Feb. 21, 2002 – Ambassador Joseph Wilson leaves on his trip to Niger.