Nov. 20, 2001 – The French, who lead the business-government consortium controlling Niger’s uranium exports, say there is “no possibility” that any yellowcake (unprocessed uranium) from Niger was diverted to Iraq.

 
This is the point, about a month after the first intelligence report on the purported Iraq-Niger uranium deal, at which the Niger uranium story should have been laid definitively to rest. Indications are that CIA actually knows very early that the documents purported as evidence for the deal are bogus; see below.

Nov. 21, 2001 – Bush asks Donald Rumsfeld to provide a formal plan of invasion for war against Iraq.

Same day – Bush goes to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, eats dinner with the troops and tells them, “Afghanistan is just the beginning on the war against terror.” Fort Campbell is home to the 101^st airborne and also to the Fifth Group Special Forces, a group of highly trained soldiers fluent in Arabic, Pashtun, and Dari. In March 2002, they are shifted from looking for Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to Iraq.

(De la Vega, 102).

Same day – Israeli and other sources report “Iraq not linked to September 11.” As reported by the British Telegraph newspaper,

 
“ISRAELI intelligence agencies have not detected any link between Iraq and the September 11 terrorist attacks, officials said yesterday. They also dismissed claims that Osama bin Laden has acquired nuclear weapons.”

Nov. 26, 2001 – The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs (Peter Rodman), produces an Action Memo for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

The memo seeks “approval of the creation of a Team B, called the Policy Counter Terror Evaluation Group (PCTEG). Through independent analysis and evaluation, the PCTEG would determine what is known about al Qaida’s worldwide terror network, its suppliers, and relationship to states and other international terrorist organizations,” etc.

PCTEG might have been a good idea. As things turn out, however, PCTEG never comes to include more than two analysts. In letters to Sen. John Warner (R-VA) and Rep. Jane Harmon (D-CA) on June 21, 2003, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith will describe PCTEG’s function as mostly to “help me develop proposals for Defense Department strategies for the war on terrorism, which is a policy exercise, not an intelligence activity.”

http://www.dougfeith.com/docs/DOD_1.pdf

 
Same day – In a news conference, Bush singles out Iraq publicly for the first time, initiating public revelations that Iraq is “phase two”:

 
“"Saddam Hussein agreed to allow inspectors in his country, and in order to prove to the world he's not developing weapons of mass destruction, he ought to let the inspectors back in," Bush said. "Afghanistan is still just the beginning.”

(“Baghdad veers back into Washington’s crosshairs,” Jim Lobe, Asia Times Dec. 4, 2001)

 
Bush also says, "Saddam is evil," and "I think he's got weapons of mass destruction, and I think he needs to open up his country to let us inspect."

 
As quoted in the British Telegraph newspaper, “Mr Bush said it was obvious from Saddam's previous use of chemical weapons that he was a threat and harboured ambitions towards mass terrorism. “It's up to him to prove he's not,” said Mr Bush, reversing the onus of proof.”

Actually, Saddam did allow U.N. inspectors into Iraq, but the flat assertion by Bush and others that he did not was sufficient to overcome the facts on the ground. 

Nov. 27, 2001 – Rumsfeld tells CentCom Commander General Tommy Franks, Commander of Operations in Afghanistan, that the president wants formal war plans against Iraq.

 
Same day – Bush issues the “Executive Order Waiver of Dual Compensation Provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964.” The order allows former CIA personnel returning to work in the GWOT (‘war on terror’) to continue to draw retirement benefits while they draw pay.

If you’re going to pressure the Intelligence Community to turn in the intelligence products you want, it is probably helpful to have a carrot as well as a stick.

 
Nov. 29, 2001 – The United Nations passes U.N. Security Council Resolution 1382, which extends the Iraq oil-for-food program an additional 180 days. Phase 11 of the program will be in effect until May 29, 2002. The resolution stipulates that a new Goods Review List will be adopted and relevant procedures will be subject to refinement.