May, 1972, politically an action-filled month, began auspiciously for President Nixon with the sudden death on May 2 of FBI Director and fearsome White House antagonist J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover’s longtime loyal secretary then destroyed his files on Washington notables inside and outside government, a potential blackmail cache. In an episode pertaining to a future administration, the young George W. Bush – called “Junior” – soon hit the skids in some way, blowing his record with the Air National Guard. As the month went on, on May 15 George Wallace – Nixon’s main threat from the right in the 1972 election – was shot and injured too badly to continue campaigning. Meanwhile, the Nixon White House, undoubtedly relieved by the fortuitous removal of two political threats – Hoover and Wallace -- forged ahead with plans including a scheme to wiretap the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, headed by Kennedy loyalist Lawrence O’Brien. The perpetrators, hired by CREEP (Committee to Reelect the President), made their first attempt during the Memorial Day weekend.

J. Edgar Hoover had been feared by presidents of both parties for decades, but Nixon’s expansion of presidential power through secrecy, coercion, and manipulation of opponents made collision with the FBI inevitable.

On February 4, 1971, Nixon Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman had already written in his diary that “[Attorney General John] Mitchell and I had a two-hour session with the P [president] on a number of items. First we discussed the whole question of J. Edgar Hoover and whether he should be continued. The decision was that Mitchell should go ahead with his implementation of his internal security planning operations [something of a euphemism], which Hoover opposes. This may bring about a confrontation. If it does, we’ll see how we handle it from there. The P made it clear that Hoover has got to be replaced before the end of Nixon’s first term because we can’t run the risk of the possibility of Nixon not being reelected and of someone else appointing Hoover’s successor. The problem is, we need to make this point to Hoover in such a way as to get him to resign without any big problem.”

This is blowing smoke. To get Hoover to resign was unfeasible for any president, and the fantasy of getting him to resign “without any big problem” is a fascinating instance of political hallucinating by a generally hardheaded chief of staff.

The same entry brings up George Wallace, who posed a huge problem for Nixon in threatening to siphon away the overt racist support without which Nixon knew he could not win: “There was some discussion of the Wallace question. It appears that Wallace is interested in making a deal of some kind that will make it unnecessary for him to run for P, which he apparently does not want to do. Mitchell seemed to feel that we might still want Wallace in the race, but the P felt very strongly that under any circumstances it would be better for us to have him out and that we should try to work this out.”

As the Haldeman diaries clarify, Nixon’s gang drew no lines against meddling in the internal affairs of the other party: “We also got into the question of a possible deal with [Chicago] Mayor Daley, who has indicated that he will not do anything to oppose the P [in the 1972 election] if Clem Stone agrees to stay out of the Governor’s race in Illinois.” The general public was never permitted to know what George McGovern was up against in the 1972 election.

Incidentally, Nixon’s old dislike of bubble cars, which had come up with regard to JFK, cropped up again with regard to George Wallace. Haldeman’s diary entry for May 25, 1971, says “I had no contact at all with the P during the day except for a quick phone call in the morning before we left Key Biscayne, when he wanted to overrule the indication in the schedule that he would be riding in the bubble-top in the motorcade.” [Haldeman inserts a note here to define and discuss the “bubble-top” limousine and to explain that Nixon didn’t like it.]  “We had already changed it and put him into the Secret Service follow-up convertible, so that was no problem. We had great crowds in Memphis and Birmingham, and the trip went extremely well. It should have had some pretty substantial significance in terms of Southern strategy. George Wallace was with us all day. Couldn’t have been more friendly [or less in a bubble car]. Stayed right with the P, got in every picture with him that he could.”

Nixon often made mistakes, and sometimes issued directions overruled or simply ignored by subordinates, but his perceptions about George Wallace and J. Edgar Hoover were on the nose.

Fortuitously, as the diary entry for Tuesday, May 2, 1972, reads, “Kleindienst called me at 9:15 this morning to say that J. Edgar Hoover had died in his sleep during the night, raised the question of how we wanted to announce it, and what our plans were on succession. I immediately went over to the EOB, where the P was, and told him. He said definitely he wanted to announce it, talked about successors to a certain degree . . .”

Every Washington insider knew that Hoover kept potential blackmail files on key Washington personnel, but this cache of politically invaluable material was destroyed by his secretary when Hoover died. There may have been quiet chagrin over that action in some quarters: “Then Kleindienst called with the details. The maid had found Hoover lying on the floor by his bed at 8:30 this morning. Problem was that she then called his secretary, Miss Gandy, and she called Hoover’s doctor . . .” In other words, Hoover’s secretary, not the White House, controlled the situation.

But many people must have breathed easier, and soon the White House received further political relief. On Monday, May 15, 1972, Haldeman’s diary reads, “This afternoon we got the report that George Wallace was shot. I waited a while to try and get some information, finally went in a little after 5:00 and interrupted the P’s meeting . . . I informed the P that we had the report that he had been shot. The P looked very annoyed at being told this and said, “Is he killed?” and I said, “No.”

Dubya was clearly not the only individual who felt that political screws had been loosened in the Washington Kremlin. The White House moved aggressively forward on certain operations.

Lawrence O’Brien, head of the DNC and in Nixon’s eyes a stand-in for the Kennedys, had been targeted since 1970: “[P] Wants us to move hard on Larry O’Brien now that he’s back as DNC chairman. P feels this is clear signal that Teddy [Kennedy] is back in control, all the maneuvering was just a dodge to cover this. Is worried about O’Brien’s effectiveness, especially as a spokesman, will say anything and has great ability to get on TV. Wants Chotiner to manage Operation O’Brien.” [March 4, 1970]

As Jimmy Breslin wrote in How the Good Guys Finally Won, “In the White House one day, Ehrlichman had proclaimed that all government investigatory resources should converge upon Larry O’Brien so that O’Brien would be put into a prison before the 1972 election.” (9)

The first break-in of the DNC Watergate office, over Memorial Day, failed to install successful bugs and was followed up three weeks later. This time, however, the perps were caught, and the rest is – up to a point -- history. On June 18, 1972, Haldeman writes, “The big flap over the weekend has been news reported to me last night, then followed up with further information today, that a group of five people had been caught breaking into the Democratic headquarters . . .”

It would still be nice to know what Nixon was so terrified that O’Brien might “say.” O’Brien was intrinsic to the Kennedy White House during Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the JFK assassination; he had been a Kennedy campaign operative; he dealt with patronage, the media and campaign contributors; and he stayed on for a time under Johnson. The Nixon White House correctly perceived O’Brien as a Kennedy man through and through – although it was excessively timorous in assuming that that loyalty would automatically transfer to other Democrats.

A man with O’Brien’s contacts must also have been cognizant of what the diaries make so clear about the Nixon years, including the White House’s using George Wallace and using evangelist Billy Graham to control Wallace; undermining and impeding the FBI; using the IRS for political retaliation; interfering in the primaries of the other party; ongoing friction with Henry Kissinger; and covert manipulations in the Vietnam War.

No wonder the FBI (as we now know) ratted out Nixon to Bob Woodward; the Bureau must have been continually galled by White House operations.

Haldeman’s diary reveals a White House always on tenterhooks, poised for even worse exposure – some revelation that would vaporize Nixon’s political advantage before the polls closed on Election Day in November 1972. As we know, it did not happen. The only “October Surprise” that year was Kissinger’s October 26 announcement that “peace is at hand,” followed next day by Nixon’s halting the bombing on Hanoi. As Jim Wright pointed out in his book Balance of Power, millions of Americans went to the polls thinking the Vietnam War was all but over – only to have Nixon resume bombing after the election.

Exactly what was the Nixon crew frightened of? Regrettably, we may never be sure, because Nixon never had to answer to the public.