Today’s blog is the third in an ongoing series on aviation security, among blogs on other topics.  The idea here is not to start seeing terrorists under every bed or in every cargo-handling area.  The point is that, three years after 9/11, the Bush administration is still much more intent on exploiting tragedy than on preventing it.  By the unwritten rules that govern the tradition of loyal opposition in this country, John Kerry and John Edwards can hardly point this out.  But I can.

 

While ordinary passengers endure continually increased scrutiny to board a plane, scrutiny at the top (re hiring and firing, for example) has been significantly less intense.  Those of us in the bottom 98% who flew last June will have our names turned over to federal authorities.  But in regard to adequate background checks, training and supervision either by contractors or by hastily-formed government agencies, there remains a real question about who, if anyone, is minding the store.

 

Read on:

This from Brian F. Sullivan, retired FAA Special Agent in facilities risk management, New England Region (including Boston’s Logan airport, where two 9/11 jumbo jets were hijacked):

“The TSA Federal Security Director (FSD) at Dulles resigned at the beginning of the month.  When he did so, the TSA put out PR info saying what good ideas he had and how he was seen as a helpful asset, etc., etc, ad nauseum.  Scott McHugh wouldn't comment on the reasons for his resignation.”

 

“The story behind the story is that he recognized the facade of security promulgated by the TSA and probably couldn't stand the stink anymore, as is evidenced [below]”:

 

The 159 positions of Federal Security Director, responsible for hundreds of airports around the country, were part of the hasty creation of the new TSA within the new “Homeland Security” department.  Those positions were filled within a few months, leading to frequent turnovers and other problems.

 

Some typical comments from the field, from security sources who prefer not to be named:

  • “We'll take any and all screeners who wish to transfer here.  We are continuing our 1+ per day attrition rate and are down to just above 600 screeners.  The new headquarters figures for Dulles claim we need 699, so in essence we are short roughly 100 FTE screeners.  My preference is to hire p/t screeners and thereby turn the 100 screener shortage into 160 p/t folks to maximize their utilization.  However given how many personnel we are bleeding.......I will take anything I can get at this point.”
  • “As a reminder, we have a "interim" baggage screening system which means it is manual and consists of 28 L-3's, 5500's, and 2500's PLUS 53 stand-alone primary ETD and 28 secondary ETD assigned to each EDS machine, scattered within seven (7) bag basements; the main terminal ticketing areas; the FIS international transfer area and the midfield terminal IAB.  The number of baggage screeners for Dulles (as represented by the "new" right sizing list) is still incorrect because the formula used by GRA does not take into account that our baggage screening operations are in 10 different areas of the airport which are separated by @1.5 miles of distance and consequently we are not getting any scheduling efficiencies by shifting people from one bag basement or terminal area to another "just in time" to cover surges.  (All of our screeners have to travel to the bag screening areas on foot as we have no vehicles and therefore it takes them at least 20 minutes to walk from one location to another.)”

 

Dulles Airport, be it noted, is one of the most sensitive security sites in the US:

  • “By TSA's own calculus this airport is allegedly the second highest risk airport in the country and therefore it is indefensible that we don't have enough people to meet our obligation to protect the public and the industry.”  
  • “Each day we screen less bags and the downward slope is becoming more acute as we enter summer. (Our June bookings are 7% higher than last June and 19% higher than March/April 03 when we hit bottom due to the Iraq campaign and SARS).  Consequently we are now only screening 57% of all bags with electronic screening.  Up to now we have been able to hide this fact from the public (and any terrorist surveillance teams ) as we have been shutting screening pods in the bag basements and ensuring that our EDS machines in the terminal, which are visible to the public, are fully staffed and operating at 100%.”

 

From a different venue:

  • “The discovery of a loaded weapon hidden inside a teddy bear by airport screeners at Orlando International last week is really much ado about nothing.  As the TSA continues to pat itself on the back . . . nobody has asked the most important question:  If the teddy bear had gotten through undetected, what could have happened?  This is where the US approach to aviation security post-9/11 breaks down.  Because the federal government has failed to secure the entire aviation system, the loaded weapon could have been used to hijack a commercial aircraft and slam it into a target on the ground.  By focusing almost exclusively on checkpoints and baggage, TSA has miserably failed to shore up the real vulnerabilities that lead directly to 9/11: poor flight crew training and lax cockpit door security.  Flight attendants have still not been trained adequately in the post-9/11 era and cockpit doors, although now reinforced, are still opened far too often during flight.  If both of these were done, the presence of the gun toting teddy bear would have been irrelevant.”

 

Meanwhile, back at the nation’s capital:

  • “Just a little note that still has me chuckling. Was at TSA headquarters in PentagonCity yesterday . . . As I approached the visitor entrance, I see three gentlemen - one behind the registration desk, another at the magnetometer and the third at the x-ray machine. I get through no problem but had to sit and wait a few minutes for my TSA contact to arrive and take me to the meeting. While I'm sitting I notice the three guards' dress shirts: "SECURITAS."
    You can imagine that I was nearly in tears chuckling to myself.  The irony that the federal agency in charge of airport security - created by Congress who kicked out all the private security firms, namely the foreign-owned firms - exactly hire one of those foreign-owned security firms to provide security at its own headquarters.”
  • “Not only that but as I'm sitting there I can see the registration desk guard searching USAJOBS.COM for new employment.”