White House “energy policy,” continued:

Following through from yesterday’s blog -- Anyone who delves into the White House’s own web site can see what Bush priorities were, in 2001.  Compare, for example, any other topic on the White House plate to that of “energy.”

The difference is apparent almost at a glance.  Everything else gets short shrift, compared to energy “security” or “efficiency” or “deregulation.”  Let’s take – picking a random example, here – the topic of “terrorism,” about which we have heard much from the Bush White House since 9/11, and about which we heard very little before 9/11.

With regard to terrorist threats, remember how much the White House talked about the difficulties of “reorganizing government”?  Remember the whining about how hard it is to get Washington to change?  Remember how every proposal about the intelligence community has been met with arguments on dealing with numerous government agencies, layers of bureaucracy, bureaucratic infighting, structural impediments, etcetera, etcetera and blahblahblah?

Well, when it comes to “energy efficiencies,” they handled all that with a stroke of a pen.  Here is Bush’s Executive Order titled “Actions to Expedite Energy-Related Projects,” dated May 18, 2001:

“Sec. 3.  Interagency Task Force.  There is established an interagency task force (Task Force) to monitor and assist the agencies in their efforts to expedite their review of permits or similar actions, as necessary, to accelerate the completion of energy-related

projects, increase energy production and conservation, and improve transmission of energy.  The Task Force also shall monitor and assist agencies in setting up appropriate mechanisms to coordinate Federal, State, tribal, and local permitting in geographic areas where increased permitting activity is expected.  The Task Force shall be composed of representatives from the Departments of State, the Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Commerce, Transportation, the Interior, Labor, Education, Health and Human Services, Energy, Veterans Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, General Services Administration, Office of Management and Budget, Council of Economic Advisers, Domestic Policy Council, National Economic Council, and such other representatives as may be determined by the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality.  The Task Force shall be chaired by the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality and housed at the Department of Energy for administrative purposes.”

(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010518-5.html)

What this longwinded but rather thorough paragraph does, in a nutshell, is establish coordinating and information-sharing for energy.  (Unfortunately, it does so with one purpose:  to stymie regulations or public scrutiny regarding issuing permits etc to the oil companies and their ilk.)

In the months that mattered, when it came to intelligence, the White House took exactly the reverse tack.  For example, Bush’s first National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD), on February 13, 2001, abolished the inter-agency working groups.

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm

The White House even went the opposite direction on immigration:

“Feb. 28, 2001.  “The Administration is also committed to addressing systemic problems in INS, particularly those related to INS' dual missions of service and enforcement. To avoid internal conflict of mission, the Administration proposes restructuring and splitting the INS into two agencies with separate chains of command and accountability, reporting to a single policy leader in the Department of Justice.”  (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/bud25.html)

What this remarkable promulgation creates, of course, is more “stovepipes” rather than fewer, although presumably they all report ultimately to Ashcroft, if that’s a save.

Throughout 2001, the White House consistently rebuffed calls for coordinating in the intelligence community:

May 7, 2001.  CNN:  Panels’ recommendations on domestic terrorism rejected, the White House announces.  “As CNN national security correspondent David Ensor reports, the White House this week will officially reject some key findings by several terrorism commissions. . . . ENSOR:  “The Hart-Rudman commission proposed a Cabinet-level agency which would fold in the Border Patrol from the Justice Department, customs from Treasury, Coast Guard from Transportation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.”
But Secretary of State Colin Powell and other administration officials will tell senators the Bush administration does not agree, that the president will keep the existing [sic] while creating an office of national preparedness and a task force under Vice President Dick Cheney to look at the federal, state and local efforts and make recommendations by October on how to improve them.” 

Instead, on May 8, 2001, VP Cheney was announced to be taking the reins of a new task force to study domestic terrorism.  Regrettably, when the task force was actually announced, it emphasized “weapons of mass destruction” rather than domestic threats. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010508.html

If you want a quick check on how effective the Vice President’s task force was, consider that on the same day, “On May 8, Rababah went to Hazmi and Hanjour’s apartment to pick them up for the trip to Connecticut.  There he says he found them with new roommates – Ahmed al Ghamdi and Majed Moqed.  These two men had been sent to America to serve as muscle hijackers and had arrived at DullesAirport on May 2.  Rababah drove Hanjour to Fairfield, Connecticut, followed by Hazmi, who had Moqed and Ghamdi in his car.  After a short stay in Connecticut, where they apparently called area flight schools and real estate agents, Rababah drove the four to Paterson to have dinner and show them around.”  [From the 9/11 Commission Report, page 230]

How in the world could these individuals, Bush and Cheney, be taken seriously as protectors and defenders?